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POLICEMAN, CONSCIENCE OR
CONFIDANT: THOUGHTS ON THE
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE OF A
SECURITIES ATTORNEY WHO
SUSPECTS CLIENT VIOLATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
MARiN B. ROBINS*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the legal profession has been the target of a
plethora of criticism for remaining oblivious to all but its clients'
interests. No area of the bar has been the recipient of greater
attack than has the securities bar. This paper examines one aspect of the debate: the obligations of a securities attorney who
believes that his client's activities are violating the federal securities laws.'
There are two settings in which client violations of the federal securities laws may arise. In the first, the client may be directly engaged in a transaction which violates the securities
laws, 2 e.g., an unregistered sale of securities which does not
qualify for an exemption 3 from registration; a purchase or sale of
* Associate with Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal; J.D. cum
laude, Harvard University Law School, 1980; B.S. summa cum laude, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, 1977.
1. In order to confine my inquiry to manageable dimensions I have
purposely excluded from consideration a related topic that I believe is best
dealt with separately: the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate a standard of conduct for attorneys confronted with the problem dealt with herein. This issue has been the subject
of a great deal of attention in its own right but analysis of it is not necessary
for present purposes.
2. The principal federal securities laws are the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--77aa (1976), [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act], which governs
the sale of newly issued securities, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a--78kk (1976), [hereinafter cited as 1934 Act], which regulates trading in outstanding securities.
3. The 1933 Act requires registration of all sales of securities under § 5
but major exemptions from § 5 are provided by: § 4(2) (transactions not
involving a public offering); § 4(6) (transaction involving certain sophisticated investors); § 4(1) (transactions engaged in by those other than issuers, underwriters and dealers); § 4(3) (some dealers' transactions); § 3(b)
(partial exemption for relatively small sales); and § 3(a) (11) (intrastate offerings). Other exemptions of transactions and securities need not be considered here.
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securities on the basis of false or misleading representations; 4 or
a securities transaction based on undisclosed inside information.5 In the second setting, the client may have violated some
statute or common law doctrine unrelated to the securities area,
which violation gave rise to a material, contingent liability and
may contemplate violation of the securities laws by failing to
make full disclosure of such material contingent liability in the
required by
financial statements included in the periodic filings
6
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The securities lawyer who feels that his client may be involved in a violation of the securities laws has, essentially, four
options. 7 He may do nothing; he can simply remain silent and
not investigate the client's behavior or protest to anyone with
authority to modify the client's conduct. He may investigate,
4. Several provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts prohibit false representations as well as incomplete representations which fail to state a material fact and are thus misleading. Such provisions include § 11 of the 1933
Act (pertaining only to 1933 Act registration statements); § 12(2) of the 1934
Act (general prohibition of fraud in connection with securities transactions); § 17 of the 1933 Act (general antifraud provision) and § 10(b) of the
1934 Act along with SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Rule lOb-5] (general antifraud provision). Misrepresentations in
proxy materials given to shareholders are also prohibited by § 14(a) of the
1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).
5. Numerous cases establish that this is a violation of Rule 10b-5. See
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, at 1010-40, (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BRUDNEY].
6. Publicly held corporations, as defined in §§ 12(a)( and (g) of the

1934 Act, are required by §§ 12(a), (g) and 13(a) of the 1934 Act to file annual

reports-pertaining inter alia to the corporation's current financial statuswith the SEC as well as make analogous quarterly reports and promptly

report to the SEC many extraordinary events. These reports are referred to
as the 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K reports respectively. Since the reports must include a balance sheet which reflects all material contingent liabilities, failure to disclose a material contingent liability attributable to a past violation
constitutes a separate violation. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text. Moreover, Rule 10b-5 requires all reporting companies to disclose material developments regarding their operations even if they are not engaged
in trading activities. BRUDNEY, supra note 5, at 1066-78. Of course, the filing
of a periodic report that is false or misleading in any other way constitutes
an independent violation.
7. The lawyer obviously cannot affirmatively assist the client in the vi-

olation, e.g., by acceding to the client's request that the lawyer draft a false
document. "Of course, the lawyer, like everyone else, has always been liable under the federal securities laws where he engaged in active fraud."

Note, The Duties and Obligationsof the Securities Lawyer: The Beginning
of a New Standardforthe Legal Profession?, 1975 DuKE LJ. 121, 127. This

conclusion may not be applicable to a situation in which the client's violation consists of failing to disclose the contingent liability attributable to a
past transgression in current SEC filings. There is authority for the proposition that the attorney can participate in the preparation of such disclosure
documents even though he is aware of the omission of the contingent liability. See infra note 186.
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and if he determines that the client has violated or intends to
violate the law he may prevail on those with authority to refrain
from the objectionable activity. If he does not attempt or succeed in pursuing the latter course of action he may resign the
representation. Finally, after pursuing or without pursuing the
above steps, he may disclose his suspicions to the SEC or the affected parties.8 It is the question of whether the lawyer should
be required to disclose suspected violations to the SEC or to potential victims of his client's scheme that has triggered the most
controversy. The remainder of this article is devoted to an analysis of existing authority and a consideration of the course of
action advocated by this author for attorneys who find themselves caught between loyalties to their client and responsibilities to the public.
EXISTING AUTHORrTY
The SEC View
The SEC's view is best understood by analyzing the two
principal proceedings brought against attorneys who allegedly
violated the SEC's standard of conduct.
National Student Marketing Corporation
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corporation9 was an injunctive action brought by the SEC against National Student
Marketing Corporation (NSMC), several of its executives, its
certified public accountants and the attorneys and law firms involved in a merger between NSMC and Interstate National Corporation (Interstate). 1° Under the terms of the merger the
managements of both corporations submitted proxy materials to
their respective shareholders for approval. The NSMC materials included financial statements showing a profit in the previous nine-month period. Shareholder approval was obtained, a
date was set for the closing and the merger was publicized. Ac8. As a practical matter disclosure to either the SEC or affected parties
will produce the same consequences. Such disclosure will trigger an SEC
investigation as well as induce the victims of the wrong to pursue their own
legal remedies. Notification to the SEC will probably also have the effect of
alerting potentially aggrieved investors.
9. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). The textual factual summary which
follows is derived from the final opinion of District Judge Parker in SEC v.
National Student Mktg. Corp. It represents the disposition at the trial level
of the action against the only law firm defendant that did not enter a settlement agreement with the SEC prior to trial.
10. The action was brought against the newly merged corporation.
Thus, reference to action taken by the SEC against NSMC, refers to action
taken against NSMC and former Interstate personnel.
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cording to the merger agreement, each party was to receive from
the accountant of the other a "comfort letter" indicating, in essence, the accountants' belief that the financial statements in
the proxies were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, fairly presented the financial status of the particular company and had not been materially affected by changes occurring subsequent to their date.
The attorneys for Interstate did not receive the comfort letter from NSMC's accountants by the date set for the closing.
When NSMC's attorney contacted the NSMC accountants, he
was informed that certain adjustments in their income statement were required. The proposed adjustments converted the
sizeable profit indicated on the income statement to a small loss.
The income statement given the shareholders was, therefore, erroneous even though the adjustments did not affect the full year
results which still showed a sizeable profit.
Interstate executives and attorneys considered waiving the
comfort letter and proceeding with the closing as planned in order to avoid any adverse effect which a date change could have
on the stock price of either company. The Interstate contingent
proceeded with the closing. The attorneys for both parties issued opinion letters providing that "Interstate (NSMC) had
taken all actions and procedures required of it by law and that
all transactions in connection with the merger had been duly
and validly taken, to the best knowledge of counsel, in full compliance with applicable law."" After the closing, the NSMC accountant informed the NSMC attorney that, in his view, the
adjustments in the income statement required 12resolicitation of
the shareholders. Interstate rejected the idea.
Subsequently, public questioning of NSMC's financial
soundness caused a collapse in the price of NSMC stock. The
SEC investigated and sought to enjoin all parties, attorneys and
accountants from violating the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. The SEC's view of the lawyers' obligation in this situation was indicated in its complaint.
As part of the fraudulent scheme [the attorneys for both parties]
...failed to insist that the financial statements be revised and
shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing
their respective clients and, under the circumstances, notify the
11. Id. at 690. Whether this opinion referred to substantive legality or
mere compliance with applicable procedures, e.g., board and shareholder
approval, etc., was never definitively resolved. The court also found that the
Interstate representatives were concerned about the possibility of shareholder lawsuits in the event that the merger was abandoned since the terms
appeared to be very favorable to the Interstate shareholders.
12. The principals and attorneys decided against undoing the merger
because of the possible effect of such a move on the price of the NSMC
stock received in consideration of the merger. See infra note 51.
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plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of the nine
month financialstatements .

The SEC argued that the lawyers had a duty to postpone the
merger until the shareholders could be resolicited with adjusted
financials and that this duty included disclosure, to the SEC
and/or the shareholders, of the clients' refusal to resolicit.
Breach of that duty was viewed as aiding and
abetting the cli14
ent's violations of the antifraud provisions.
The NSMC proceeding evinced the SEC's intention to expand the obligation of the securities practitioner, in a nonlitigation setting, from mere allegiance to his client to an affirmative
obligation to the public as well. 15 Then Commissioner A.A.

Sommer, Jr. likened the role of the securities lawyer in the nonlitigation setting to that of a certified public accountant. 16 This
13. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 290 (D.D.C.
1973) (quoting 48(i) of SEC complaint) (emphasis added).
14. One commentator, writing soon after the filing of the complaint,
summarized his view of the implications of the SEC position as follows:
The crux of the Commission's proposition is that a lawyer who prepares
disclosure documents on behalf of a public company really has two clients: the company, including both directors and shareholders, and the
trading markets. When the interests of these clients conflict, the lawyer
is obligated to favor the faceless mass of potential securities buyers
over the company which is in fact his employer.
Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Policy Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 at 440-41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lipman I .
15. Although the Commissioner's sentiments were expressed in informal speeches, experienced practitioners in the field generally concede that
such public statements are often indicative of Commission policy. Id. at
472-73.
Former SEC Commissioner Irving Pollack advised the bar that "[t]he
client [of a securities attorney] is the corporation and, in the case of a publicly held corporation in today's environment, that means the corporation
and the public because of the ever changing composition of the corporations' stockholders." Landau, Problems of Professional Responsibility, 6
INST. ON SEC. REG. (PLI) 191, 216 (1975).
16. I would suggest, that in securities matters (other than those
where advocacy is clearly proper), the attorney will have to function in
a manner more akin to that of the auditor than to that of the advocate.
It means he will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the
public who engage in securities transactions that would never have
come about were it not for his professional presence. It means he will
have to adopt the healthy scepticism toward the representations of
management which a good auditor must adopt. It means he will have to
do the same thing the auditor does when confronted with an intransigent client-resign.
Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, 11973-74
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631. It is interesting to note
that former Commissioner Sommer did not explicitly call for disclosure of
the misrepresentation to the SEC.
It should also be noted that as indicated by the Sommer speech, as well
as other authority, the SEC wishes to confine the scope of the lawyer's duty
to affirmatively intervene to protect the public from fraud to situations in
which he is functioning exclusively as an adviser as opposed to an advocate
in litigation. See Gruenbaum, Corporate/SecuritiesLawyers: Disclosure,
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view substantially departs from the traditional view of the lawyer as his client's confidant, obligated to maintain strict confidentiality
with respect to information imparted to him by the
17
client.
According to the SEC complaint, the lawyers' duty of disclosure attached after consummation of the merger, i.e., after the
violation occurred.' 8 Thus, the SEC indicated that, in addition
to disclosure of intended violations, the lawyer must disclose
the client's past securities violations. The imposition of a duty
to report past misconduct is generally considered to be a greater
departure from the traditional obligation of the lawyer than is
the imposition of a duty to report future misconduct. 19 Its settlement with one of the defendant law firms in this case reflected
the SEC's insistence that a lawyer must occasionally "turn in"
his client (even with respect to a past violation) and always has
an affirmative obligation to attempt to prevent the consummation of fraudulent transactions.
In relevant part, the agreement between the law firm of
White & Case and the SEC provided that:
1) the firm will refuse to issue any opinion letter in connection with any issuance of securities to the public where it has
knowledge that its client has made any material misrepresentation
in connection with the transaction and has not taken appropriate
corrective action, and
2) where the firm becomes aware that in connection with any
transaction involving the issuance of securities to the public by its
client, the client has made any material misrepresentations, the
firm will "advise the client of the client's disclosure obligations
under the Federal Securities laws and if the client does not take
appropriate action to comply with such obligations, the responsible
partner will consider with at least two other partners of the firm the
need for the firm to withdraw from employment or take other appropriateaction."20

Presumably, the italicized portion refers to public disclosure of
the violation where the client has refused to rectify it. In its settlement with one defendant law firm in this case, the SEC was
adamant in its insistence that a lawyer has a duty to "turn in"
Responsibility,Liability to Investors, and National Student Mktg. Corp., 54
NoTRE DAME LAw. 795, 800, (1979) [hereinafter cited as Gruenbaum].
17. Comment, A SecuritiesLawyer's Dilemma: The SEC's Policy of Disclosurev. the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 797, 814 (1978).
18. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp. [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360, at pp. 91,913-17 (Feb. 3, 1972).
19. Cf.Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraudthe Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAw. 1389, 1410-19 (1978) [hereinafter cited

as Hoffman].
20. [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 96,027, at p. 91,600
(May 2,1977) (emphasis added).
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his client (even with respect to a past violation) and always has
an affirmative obligation to attempt to prevent the consummation of fraudulent transactions on the part of the client.
In re Carter and Johnson
An indication of the standard prescribed by the SEC (and
possible departures from its NSMC position) is provided by
analysis of In re Carterand Johnson2 in which the obligation of
counsel to control his client was a major issue. In re Carter was
a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Commission against
two attorneys accused of primary violations of the securities
22
laws and of aiding and abetting the violations of their client,
21. 11981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847, p. 84,145
(Feb. 28, 1981). The textual discussion focuses on the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission in In re Carter and Johnson. In re Carter
came before the Commission on appeal from an administrative hearing in
which the attorney-defendants were found, by the administrative law judge
(AJ), to have violated the SEC's ethical standards. The opinion of the In
re Carter proceeding at the administrative level appears at [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

82,175, p. 82,165 (March 7, 1979).

22. The proceeding was brought under 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981). The
relevant portions of the Rule are set forth below(e) Suspension and disbarment. (1) The Commission may deny,
temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing
before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission
after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully
aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--80b-20), or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
(2) (provides for suspension from SEC practice of anyone suspended or disbarred by state authorities or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude]
(3) (i) The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and
without preliminary hearing, may by order temporarily suspend from
appearing or practicing before it any attorney, accountant, engineer or
other professional or expert who, on or after July 1, 1971 has been by
name:
(a) Permanently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction by reason of his misconduct in an action brought by the Commission from violation or aiding and abetting the violation of any
provision of the Federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--80b-20) or of
the rules and regulations thereunder; or
(b) Found by any court of competent jurisdiction in an action brought by the Commission to which he is a party or found by
this Commission in any administration proceeding to which he is a
party to have violated or aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-80b-20) or of the
rules and regulations thereunder (unless the violation was found not
to have been willful).
There is substantial disagreement concerning the authority of the SEC to
regulate the practice of law by promulgating this rule. See generally State-
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National Telephone Company (NTC), which was disseminating
misleading financial information to its shareholders and the general public.
Some of the misleading information was contained in an annual report which was included in a proxy solicitation by NTC
which asked for approval to transfer certain assets to a newly
created subsidiary in order to obtain bank financing. Despite
approval of the transfer and the financing plan, NTC remained
in serious financial trouble. Nevertheless, several very optimistic press releases were issued, apparently without the knowledge of the directors. Soon thereafter, the attorneys suggested
to management that it communicate with the shareholders and
the general public regarding the financial problems. 23 This advise was disregarded.
About a month later, the firm was forced to enter an agreement with several bank creditors under which additional funds
would be advanced. Under a critical provision, however, if a default should occur within seven months, the firm would be required to implement a "lease maintenance plan" (LMP) forcing
a drastic curtailment of NTC's operations. When the agreement
was closed, NTC published a press release prepared by an NTC
attorney announcing the closing of the loan agreement. It did
not, however, refer to the LMP, the likelihood of its implementation, or how the LMP might affect the future of the company.
Three days later, without consulting its attorneys, NTC sent a
very optimistic letter to its shareholders. The attorneys considered advising corrective action but decided that certain earlier
communications would offset any misleading impression left by
the letter.
About two weeks later, NTC attorneys prepared and filed a
form 8-K 24 with the SEC. Execution of the bank credit agreement was mentioned, but again, no reference to the LMP was
included because of management's belief that such disclosure
would adversely affect employee morale. About two months
later, the banks advised the attorneys that disclosure and implementation of the LMP would be necessary. The attorneys questioned NTC management and were left with the impression that
resort to the LMP would not be necessary. About two weeks
later, however, it became clear to the attorneys that the banks
ment of ABA Section of Corporation,Banking and Business Law, 513 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-5 (July 25, 1979); [1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 82,144 (statement of former SEC Comm'r Karmal July

25, 1979).
23. Presumably in accordance with the company's obligation under
Rule lOb-5.
24. See supra note 6.
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were right; default was imminent and implementation would, in
fact, be necessary.
Though advised of the necessity of disclosure, NTC's chief
executive officer disregarded his attorney's instructions on the
ground that an attempt was being made to negotiate a waiver of
NTC's obligation. No mention of the situation was made to the
directors or anyone else. One month later, when the directors
were initially apprised of the seriousness of the situation, disclosure was made and the chief executive officer was forced to
resign.
The SEC alleged that the attorneys' conduct violated Rule
2(e) of the Securities Exchange Act 25 in the following respects:
(1) direct participation in the preparation of a misleading press
release and a misleading 8-K; (2) failure to take any corrective
action; (3) failure "to communicate with the board of directors
of National or to ensure that required disclosures were made in
filings with the Commission and otherwise, despite the optimistic information about the company then extant in the marketplace"; (4) assisting management in dissementing misleading
information; (5) failing to ensure that required disclosures were
conmade or to communicate with National's board of directors
26
cerning management's failure to make such disclosures.
The conduct alleged was "aiding and abetting" the client's
primary securities violations. It was summarily claimed that the
lawyers, "(a) do not possess the requisite qualifications to appear and practice before the Commission in the representation
of others; and (b) are lacking in character and integrity and
have engaged in unethical and improper professional
'27
conduct.
The SEC discounted the aiding and abetting allegations
against the lawyers on the ground that frequent caveats to disclose, by the attorneys to NTC management, negated the intent
element of the aiding and abetting offense. 28 The allegations of
unprofessional conduct were also dismissed 29 because of the
lack of a clearly defined standard of conduct for attorneys con25. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981).
26. In re Carter and Johnson [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,175, pp. 82,168-69 (ALT March 7, 1979).
27. Id. at p. 82,180.
28. "Although it is a close judgment, after careful review, we conclude
that the available evidence is insufficient to establish that either respondent acted with sufficient knowledge and awareness or recklessness to satisfy the test for willful aiding and abetting liability." In re
Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,847, pp. 84,145, 84,167 (Feb. 28, 1981).
29. Id. 82,847 at p. 84,170.
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fronted with a corporate client's refusal to comply with disclosure requirements. However, the SEC went on to specify the
standard of conduct to which it would henceforth hold attorneys
30
practicing before it.

When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation
of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in
a substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards unless 31
he takes prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance.
The SEC explained that it would not require lawyers to take
corrective action in "every isolated disclosure action or inaction
[believed] .. .to be at variance with applicable disclosure standards. '32 "[C]ounselling accurate disclosure is sufficient" until
it becomes apparent that "[such] advice is not being followed,
or even sought in good faith, and that [the] client is involved in a
continuing course of violating the securities laws.

' 33

At this

34
point, "further, more affirmative steps" are required.
Resignation in a manner which avoids "forseeable prejudice
to the client" is deemed to be one such step. 35 The SEC recognized that less drastic steps such as approaching members of
management or directors not involved in the unlawful activity
might be sufficient. 36 Although not prescribing resignation as
the sole alternative 37 for a lawyer faced with his client's direct
refusal to obey the securities laws, the SEC declared that under
some circumstances, e.g., where the client's misconduct is so

30. Note, however, that the SEC has solicited public comments as to
whether this standard should be expanded or modified. S.A. Rel. No. 336344 (CCH) 83,026 (1981).
31. In re Carter and Johnson, 11981 Transfer Binder] FE. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) at (CCH) 82,847 at p. 84,172.
32. Id. The Commission went on to say that:
there may be isolated disclosure failures that are so serious that their
correction becomes a matter of primary professional concern. It is also
clear.., that a lawyer is not privileged to unthinkingly permit himself
to be co-opted into an ongoing fraud and cast as a dupe or a shield for a
wrong doing client.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. "What is required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the
conclusion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying
problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a strong-willed,
but misguided client." Id.
37. "Premature resignation serves neither the end of an effective lawyer-client relationship nor, in most cases, the effective administration of the
securities laws. The lawyer's continued interaction with his client will ordinarily hold the greatest promise of corrective action." Id.
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egregious or the involvement of the client's management and di38
rectors so pervasive, resignation would be required.
Of possibly greater import than the SEC's pronouncement
of a standard of conduct is an issue raised in a footnote: the issue whether securities counsel must disclose his client's illegal
intentions to regulatory authorities or affected third parties.
This case does not involve, nor do we here deal with, the additional
question of when a lawyer, aware of his client's intention to commit
fraud or an illegal act, has a professional duty to disclose that fact
either publicly or to an affected third party. Our interpretation today does not require such action at any point, although other existing standards of professional
39 conduct might be so interpreted.
See, e.g., ABA D.R. 7-102(B).
The footnote quoted above appears to indicate that if the
corporate attorney has a duty of disclosure to third parties, it
attaches only after the fact of the client's violation, i.e., the lawyer has no obligation to disclose his client's intent to violate the
securities laws.
The pronouncement set forth above constitutes the standard to which the SEC presently intends to hold attorneys practicing before it. However, in view of the SEC's solicitation of
comments regarding such standard 4° and the pendency of the
American Bar Association's effort to revise the Code of Professional Responsibility, discussed later, significant alterations in
this standard are a distinct possibility.
Judicial Considerationof the Issue
The courts have also grappled with the issue of counsel's
responsibility but have failed to provide a cohesive theory. An
examination of the courts' treatment of this issue, beginning
with NSMC and continuing with other cases discussed in this
section, involving identical or related issues, reveals the lack of a
judicial consensus as to the proper scope of responsibility for
the securities practitioner.
38. [T]here may occur situations where the lawyer must conclude
that the misconduct is so extreme or irretrievable, or the involvement
of his client's management and board of directors in the misconduct is
so thoroughgoing and pervasive that any action short of resignation
would be futile. We would anticipate that cases where a lawyer has no
choice but to resign would be rare and of an egregious nature.
Id. 82,847 at p. 84,173.
39. Id. 82,847 at p. 84,173 n.78.
40. See supra note 32.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:373

National Student Marketing Corporation
The allegations levelled against the attorneys in NSMC
principally involved charges of "aiding and abetting" primary violations.4 1 As defined by the court, the elements of that offense
are: (1) a primary violation by another person; (2) a "general
awareness" on the part of the aider and abettor that his role is
part of an overall improper activity; (3) knowledge and substantial assistance of the violation by the aider and abettor. 2
Applied to the facts of the NSMC case, consummation of the
merger when the principals were aware of the misleading nature of the financial statements contained in the proxy solicitations constituted a primary violation by the principals. 43 Having
established the first element, the court examined the three instances of alleged attorney misconduct to determine whether
the two remaining elements of the cause of action had been satisfied. The three allegations considered were: (1) the failure of
the attorneys to take any action to interfere with the consummation of the merger after they became aware that shareholder approval had been obtained on the basis of misleading financials;
(2) the issuance of the opinion letter in spite of the attorneys'
knowledge of the misleading financials; (3) the failure of the attorneys, after the merger was consummated, to withdraw their
opinion and disclose the falsehood to the SEC or Interstate
shareholders." The court held that the failure to interfere with
the merger closing constituted aiding and abetting of the primary violation, but determined that the second and third allegations did not constitute substantial assistance of the violations.
With respect to the failure to interfere with the closing, the
court found the issue to be whether silence or inaction should
be considered substantial assistance. The court concluded that
silence would be considered substantial assistance if the alleged
aider and abettor had a duty to speak. A duty was found to exist
in the instant case due to the presence of three conditions:
(1) "the obvious materiality of the information"; (2) the fact
that the attorneys were "learned in securities law"; (3) the re41. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 712.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 709-12.
44. Id. at 712. The SEC also included an allegation of aiding and abetting in connection with the sale of a large block of the NSMC stock received
in the merger by the Interstate shareholders. Since this issue does not appear to involve the issue of the lawyer's obligation to affirmatively intercede
to prevent or disclose his client's securities violations, it will not be
discussed.
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sponsibility of the attorneys to their corporate client. 45
Although the court found that the lawyers' conduct fell
short of legal standards, it did not feel compelled to specify
those standards since defendants had been wholly remiss in fulfilling their obligations. 46 A minimum, but not necessarily sufficient, requirement was articulated. "[Alt the very least [the
attorneys] were required to speak out at the closing concerning
the obvious materiality of the information and the concomitant
requirement that the merger not be closed until the adjustments
were disclosed and approval of the merger was again obtained
from the Interstate shareholders. '47 The opinion seems to impose an obligation on corporate counsel to take substantial steps
to bring management securities law violations to the attention of
shareholders. The court somewhat inconsistently contended,
however, that "imposition of such a duty will not require lawyers to go beyond their accepted role in securities transactions."'48 Thus, it is unclear whether the court views the correct
scope of the attorney's obligation as including only a duty to persuade those responsible for the fraud to refrain from such conduct, or whether it would require the lawyer to apprise
shareholders of the situation.
The court rejected the SEC's contention that the lawyers
had a duty to "undo" the merger after its consummation by, inter alia, withdrawing their opinion letter, demanding resolicitation of the shareholders, and disclosing the violation to
45. Id. at 713. Of course, the last factor seems to beg the question since
the issue in dispute is whether the lawyer's duty to his corporate client extends to disclosure of management wrongdoing.
46. In view of the obvious matbriality of the information, especially to
attorneys learned in securities law, the attorneys' responsibilities to
their corporate client required them to take steps to ensure that the
information would be disclosed to the shareholders. However, it is unnecessary to determine the precise extent of their obligations here,
since it is undisputed that they took no steps whatsoever to delay the
closing pending disclosure to and resolicitation of the Interstate
shareholders.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. If the court views the correct scope of the attorney's obligations
as including only a duty to try to persuade those responsible for the fraud to
refrain from such conduct, then it is entirely correct. However, the above
quoted language suggests that the court sees the lawyer as having an obligation to go beyond internal action and possibly make disclosures to the
shareholders himself. The imposition of such a duty does seem to be an
expansion of the lawyers obligation. Even Judge Parker declared that, "The
filing of the complaint in this proceeding generated significant interest and
an almost overwhelming amount of comment within the legal profession on
the scope of a securities lawyer's obligations to his client and to the investing public." Id. at 714. If the positions taken by the SEC in the complaint
were fully consistent with the accepted notion of the lawyer's duty it seems
doubtful that such a vociferous response would have been elicited.
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Interstate shareholders and/or the SEC. It was decided that
since these alleged breaches of duty occurred after the primary
violation, they did not constitute substantial assistance of the
primary violation. 49 It seems anamolous, however, to require attorneys to ensure disclosure of management's intention to commit securities violations to shareholders before they occur but
not to require any action after they occur even though such disclosure might still prevent injury. Indeed, in the instant case,
the lawyers could not be sure that the violations would occur
until literally minutes before the closing since the Interstate executives and attorneys had contemplated delaying or abandoning the transactions.5 0
The court's response to the SEC's contention that the lawyers aided and abetted the violation by issuing the opinion letter
does little to clarify its position. The court noted that even if the
opinion was false, the SEC still had to establish that it substantially assisted the violation. The court found that the opinion
did not constitute substantial assistance because it was but one
step in the merger process which entails numerous formalities
only a few of which are covered by the securities laws. Furthermore, the opinion was provided for NSMC which was already
aware of the adjustments in the comfort letter.5 1 The criterion
49. Id. at 714-15. This analysis seems difficult to reconcile with the recognition of a duty to the shareholders to delay the closing of the merger
pending resolicitation with adjusted financials since notification of the
shareholders or SEC immediately after the deal was closed would have allowed an injunctive action to be brought to undo the merger before the operations of the two companies were integrated. Thus, while the attorneys'
failure to disclose the violations after the deal was closed may not have constituted substantial assistance of the violations themselves, it does seem
that their silence could be said to have contributed to the success of the
fraudulent scheme.
One hint at a possible reconciliation of the court's positions is provided
by its very cryptic discussion of the obligation of the lawyers to report management's continuing violation-apparently its failure to disclose the original
violation during the time that trading in NSMC shares was occurring. The
court indicated that it would not address any question of the lawyers' obligation to disclose the continuing violation in this case because the SEC had
not raised such a claim in timely fashion. The fact that the court mentioned
the point at all suggests that it might be willing to impose liability on a similar theory in a future case where the argument is properly raised. This
would impose some sort of post-violation duty on the attorney.
50. One account of the events that occurred on the day of the closing
indicated that the Interstate contingent did not decide to proceed with the
transaction until 3:30 p.m. and that the documents were fied at the appropriate office at 3:46 p.m. J. GOULDEN, THE MILLION DoLLAR LAWYERS, 168
(1978). Thus, the attorneys had, at most, 16 minutes in which to take action
to interfere with the closing since no duty to take such action would attach
until the client actually decided to proceed with the closing.
51. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 714. The court
distinguished this type of opinion from an opinion which "addresses a specific issue and is undeniably relied on in completing the transaction." Id.
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for substantial assistance may be a simple "but for" test; e.g.,
the lawyer must not issue the opinion if the transaction could
not proceed without it, or if the substance of the opinion
is inti52
mately related to the particulars of the violation.
About the only general conclusion to be drawn from the
court's opinion is that the lawyer has a duty to at least protest to
his client when he is apprised of the client's intention to violate
the securities laws. Beyond this, it is impossible to determine
what duty the NSMC court would impose when his protestations are ignored.
Other Cases
Other court cases dealing with this issue have been handled
in a variety of ways. In Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,53 an attorney who had worked on a registration
statement for a stock issue became convinced that the document was materially misleading. He protested to senior members of his firm, but to no avail. The attorney then resigned from
the firm and gave an affidavit containing his suspicions to the
SEC. When a private suit arising from the alleged falsehood
was brought against the attorney, his former law firm, and the
issuer, the attorney provided a copy of his SEC affidavit to the
plaintiff's counsel in an effort to persuade counsel to drop him
from the list of defendants. He was dropped and the remaining
defendants moved to disqualify plaintiff's counsel as well as the
attorney who gave them the SEC affidavit on the ground that
confidential information pertaining to defendants had been imparted to the plaintiffs attorney. The district court granted the
motion to disqualify, but the court of appeals reversed the order
This analysis leaves unanswered what may be the most important question:

Is counsel required to refrain from issuing an opinion that is entirely correct when he is aware of a management securities violation relating to the
transaction for which the opinion is requested but that does not concern the
substance of the opinion? The court's apparent response to this question is
that even a valid opinion is forbidden if it substantially assists the violation.
However, this response begs the question of how close the relationship between the opinion and the transaction must be.
52. The SEC brought a proceeding that was partially addressed to this
issue. SEC v. Haswell, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $
97,156 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 19, 1977). The SEC brought an injunction action
against a bond attorney for inter alia issuing opinions relating to the legality of the issuance of certain bonds when there were material misrepresentations in the offering circulars used in the bond issue which the attorney

had reason to know of. The validity of the opinions was apparently not in
issue. The court found that the attorney did not have reason to know of the
violations when he delivered his opinions. However, the court did indicate
that if the attorney did have reason to believe that there was fraud involved

it would have been unlawful for him to deliver the opinions. Id.
53. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998.
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as it applied to plaintiff's counsel. The court of appeals relied
upon a provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
4-101(c) (4), which permits an attorney to reveal client confidences to the extent necessary to defend himself against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
It seems astounding that the court never considered
whether the original disclosures made to the SEC by the attorney were either permitted or required.5 4 Once a lawsuit has actually been brought against a lawyer, it could hardly be thought
unreasonable that the court give effect to the cited DR. Here,
however, the attorney went to the SEC well before suit was
brought against anyone connected with the transaction. The
propriety of this disclosure, in terms of the attorney client relationship, was not addressed. Moreover, assuming that disclosure was permitted, the issue whether it was required was left
open.
Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc.55 takes a more positive stand
in imposing potential liability on a lawyer for his client's securities law violations. In Black, an attorney, one of several defendants in a suit brought under the Oregon Blue Sky Law, 5 6 asked
the court to dismiss the charges against him because he did not,
and could not reasonably have known about his client's violation
of such Blue Sky Law. The court denied the motion on the
ground that the attorney's efforts had been indispensable to
completion of the violative transaction. Thus, according to
Black, if a lawyer did any work on a securities transaction that
would not have been consummated but for his efforts, the lawyer could be liable for his client's violations of the Oregon statute even if the lawyer did not and could not reasonably know of
the violations.5 7 Although lack of a reasonable opportunity to
learn of the violation would be considered a factor in deciding
the issue of liability, it would not be dispositive.5 8 The court
may, therefore, be applying a rule of absolute liabilify for client
violations to lawyers, an unprecedented approach.5 9 The opin54. The court of appeals opinion does not indicate if defendants argued
this point at any stage of the litigation. In view of the fact that this proceeding was decided more than two years after the NSMC proceeding was
brought, the lack of discussion of this issue seems startling.
55. 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Or. 1971).
56. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.005--59.115(3) (1953).
57. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc.,

333 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D. Or. 1971).

58. Id.
59. Furthermore, the "but for" standard applied by the court seems to
call for an indiscriminate application of the Oregon statute. For example, it
would, if applied literally, allow for suits against the manufacturer of the
paper on which a falsified registration statement was printed. The Oregon
Supreme Court indicated that the literal language of the Black case did not
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ion points up the lengths to which some judges would go to impose responsibility on the securities lawyer for his client's
misconduct.
Another group of decisions deals with the application and
refinement of a negligence standard to cases in which written
materials prepared by the corporate attorney turn out to be erroneous or misleading. 60 In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,61 the attorney-defendant issued an opinion that a sale of securities was
exempt from registration. This opinion was erroneous. When
the SEC brought an injunctive action against the attorney and
his client, the attorney argued that he was ignorant of the facts
which caused the opinion to be misleading. The court of appeals
rejected this defense since the lawyer's ignorance was the result
of his own negligence. The court reasoned that the lawyer's role
in administration of the securities laws was important enough,
and the public's interest in being able to rely on a lawyer's opinion great enough, to justify holding the lawyer to a duty of reasonable care. 62

The Spectrum court's reasoning could easily

apply to most securities transactions in which the lawyer plays
an important role. Indeed, the rule of Spectrum has been said to
represent the law of Oregon. Adams v. American W. Sec., Inc., 265 Or. 514,
510 P.2d 838 (1973) (lawyer not liable in the absence of knowledge of a client's violation). The case has been described as "abberational" elsewhere.
Jenkins, Attorney Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Evolving Standard, 2 J. CORP. L. 505, 533 n.224 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Jenkins].
60. Indeed, an effort to apply a negligence standard to an accountant
who failed to discover a client's fraud has already been made and rejected
in the U.S. Supreme Court in a private damage suit under Rule lob-5. Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (proof of defendant's scienter, i.e.,
intent to defraud, needed in private damage suit under Rule 10b-5). This
case did not deal with the culpability required to be established in an SEC
administrative proceeding. Cf. Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), or a
Rule lob-5 injunction suit or a private damage suit under the other antifraud provisions.
61. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 542. The groundwork for the Spectrum approach was laid in an
earlier case, Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), in which it was held at the least that an attorney serving as a director
of a corporation which is filing a registration statement is obligated to make
some investigation into the accuracy of the statements contained therein.
Some commentators have argued that the Barchrisholding is equally applicable to a lawyer serving exclusively as a lawyer, i.e., not as a director when
he assists in the preparation of a registration statement. E.g., Jenkins,
supra note 59. See generally Frank, A HigherDuty: A New Look at the Ethics of the CorporateLawyer, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 337, 345-49 (1977) (arguing
that Barchris and Spectrum were among the first cases to directly raise the
issue of the securities lawyer's responsibility to the public). The same
proposition was espoused in a virtually contemporaneous case, SEC v.
Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), which explicitly rejected the proposition
that a securities lawyer drafting offering documents is merely a scrivener
for his client who bears no responsibility for the accuracy of the statements
contained in the document.
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be that: "[A] lawyer whose negligence permits a fraudulent
scheme to succeed is susceptible to an injunctive action brought
'63
by the SEC."
The Spectrum neglience standard was refined to some extent in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc..64 In Management
Dynamics, the court held that the Spectrum standard required
analysis of theforeseeability of the role of the alleged aider and
abettor in the illegal scheme. A finding that the alleged aider
being
and abettor should have been aware that his efforts were
65
used to effect an illegal scheme was explicitly required.
Also worthy of comment is State v. Rogers,66 a disciplinary
proceeding brought against a securities attorney. The attorney,
although found to have been aware of his client's violation of the
Wisconsin Blue Sky Law, 67 took no action of any kind, either to
directly assist the violation or to prevent its commission. The
court declared that the attorney had a duty to "protest effectively" to his client and to inform the buyer of the securities of
68
the fraud.
It appears that the courts and the SEC agree on at least two
propositions. First, that disclosure of a client's past violations is
permitted, and, second, that upon learning of the client's intent
to pursue an illegal cause of action, the lawyer must, at a minimum, admonish his client to refrain from the action. Beyond
this, the courts and SEC diverge.

63. Note, The Duties and Obligations of the Securities Lawyer: The Be-

ginning of a New Standardfor the Legal Profession?, 1975 DuKE L.J. 121,

131.
64. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).

65. Id. at 811 (emphasis added). Although this case involved an allegation of aiding and abetting, against a broker-dealer, there is no indication in
the opinion that lawyers (or anyone else) would be held to any different
standard.
66. 226 Wis. 39, 275 N.W. 910 (1937).
67. Wis. STAT. §§ 189.23(2) (b), (f), (g) (1929) (repealedby L. 1969, ch. 71,
§ 1).
68. The scope of the court's holding that the lawyer had a duty to disclose the fraud to the victim is open to question since in this case the lawyer

represented both the buyer and the issuer of the securities in connection

with the same transaction.
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THE APPROACH OF THE

BAR

The Bar has grappled with the subject of attorney responsibility but has not succeeded in formulating a workable solution.
The following section of this article examines the treatment of
the problem by three of the most authoritative sources: the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); the recently promulgated draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct prepared by an ABA standing committee; and the proposal of the Georgetown University Institute for Public
Representation.
The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
Before delving into the specifics of the CPR, 69 it is necessary
to make two observations. First, it is important to realize that
although the ABA has promulgated only one version of the CPR,
the individual state bar associations have not all adopted an
identical version. 70 Accordingly, representation of a client with
operations in many states requires an attorney, at the outset, to
decide which state CPR applies. Additionally, the lawyer must
ascertain the SEC's standard of conduct. 7 1 If the CPR holds
lawyers to a different standard than does the SEC, the attorney
69. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL CODE or CPR]. The Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) appears to be an attempt to provide concrete answers to the ethical
problems commonly confronted by lawyers. However, at least in the area
considered here, the document appears to have fallen short of the mark.
The relevant provisions have been described as "even for legal writers, an
extraordinary achievement in murky cross-references and double negatives." Solomon, The CorporateLawyer's Dilemma, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 1978,
138-39.
70. "Although the vast majority of the states generally follow the ABA
Model Code, there is inconsistency with respect to the rule regarding the
lawyer's responsibility on discovery of a client's fraud committed during the
course of the representation." Kramer, Clients' Fraudsand Their Lawyers'
Obligations: A Study in ProfessionalIrresponsibility,67 GEO. L.J. 991, 99495 (1979). In fact, an important amendment adopted by the ABA in 1974 has
been adopted by only two of the six states which contain about half the
lawyers in the United States. Id. at 995. See infra note 87.
71. In In re Carter and Johnson, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,175, p. 82,165 (ALJ March 7, 1979), the AJ opinion explicitly relied on the CPR in determining what standard the attorney is held to
in SEC practice. Id. 82,175 at p. 82,181. The opinion also stated that, "counsel interested in determining the standards appropriate to his conduct
before the Commission should make reference to the ABA Code, particularly EC 5-18 and DR's 1-102(A)(4) and 7-102(A)(7)." Id. However, in an
earlier proceeding, In re Emanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,407, p. 83,172 (June 18, 1973), affd without opinion, 495
F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a Rule 2(e) attorney disciplinary proceeding, the
SEC declared that it did not deem state bar association standards of conduct to be binding on it. The point is not a minor one since professional
discipline can result from a violation of the CPR.
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may be faced with a Hobson's choice; he is bound to violate one
72
of the two standards.
The first CPR provision relevant to the responsibilities of
the securities practitioner is Canon 4 which concerns the preservation of client confidences and secrets. The substance of this
provision is contained in the Disciplinary Rules (DR's) and Ethical Considerations (EC's) promulgated under it.73

"Confi-

dence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable state law, and "secret" refers to other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. 74 DR 4-

101(B) contains the disclosure prohibition itself: "Except when
permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client; (2) use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client;
(3) use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person unless the client consents after full
disclosure." Information pertaining to client securities violations is obviously encompassed in the term confidences and
secrets since its disclosure would be embarrassing and detrimental to the client. Optional exceptions to the rule of confidentiality are contained in DR 4-101(C):
A lawyer may reveal ...

(2) Confidences or secrets when permit-

ted under Disciplinary rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. (4) Confidences or secrets
necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself...
against an accusation of wrongful conduct.

In applying this provision to the problem faced by the securities attorney, two important questions arise. First, where the
attorney represents a corporation, as he quite often does in the
securities context, who is the "client" that is entitled to claim
the benefits of the rule? Second, what constitutes a "crime" for
purposes of triggering the exception provided for in DR 4101(C) (3)?
A major controversy rages over resolution of the first question. The corporate attorney's client might rationally be any or
all of the following: the corporate entity, management, the
board of directors, the existing shareholders, future sharehold72. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.

73. Disciplinary Rules are at least nominally intended to establish a
minimum standard of conduct while Ethical Considerations are nominally
intended to specify optimal patterns of conduct. As a practical matter the
distinction between the two has become quite blurred.
74. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 4-101(A).
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ers, the employees or the public securities markets. 75 Identifying the client is crucial because if the client is perceived to be
the market, DR 4-101(B) imposes no real duty of confidentiality
on the lawyer since any disclosure of securities violations would
be to his own client, the market. If the shareholders are the client, the attorney's conduct is apparently governed by DR 4101(B) (2) which prohibits disclosures which would disadvantage the client. Consideration of the effect of a given disclosure
on the issuer's stock price would appear to be required. In most
cases, however, it would be unrealistic to expect the attorney to
predict the market's reaction.7 6 Arguably, if the shareholders
are treated as the client, the lawyer is free to make any disclosures to them that he wishes since the disclosures are to his own
client. The flaw in this argument becomes apparent, however,
when one considers the practical impossibility of limiting any
disclosure made to the shareholders of a publicly held corporation to just shareholders. If the client is considered to be corporate management the problem is simpler; the lawyer cannot
disclose anything confided to him by management.
The question of what constitutes a crime for purposes of DR
4-101(C) (3) is almost as difficult as the preceding question. In
most contexts, there is no great problem in determining if a proposed action constitutes a crime. In the securities field, how75. The only CPR provision addressed to this issue, EC 5-18, provides
little practical assistance: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation
or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder,
director, officer, employee, representative or other person connected with
the entity." This standard does not assist the lawyer in determining
whether information imparted to him by a corporate official is to be considered to have been imparted to him by the entity. Even the SEC is not
speaking with a unified voice in response to this question. Former Commissioner Pollack felt that the securities attorney's client should be considered
to be the public markets. Landau, Problems of ProfessionalResponsibility,
6 INST. ON SEc. REG. (PLI) 191,216 (1975). But former Enforcement Division

Chief Stanley Sporkin apparently felt that the question is still open:
"[T] here is a distinction between the interest of any one individual and the
corporate interest. There is a large debate going on in the corporate community and the legal community as to who is the client. That is one of the
big issues-who is the client?" What the SEC Expects from Corporation

Lawyers, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 1978, at 143-46. Another commentator has suggested that he does not agree with the view that the lawyer represents the
public market or future shareholders but feels that the lawyer represents
"the company". Lipman, supra note 14, at 499. The ALT opinion in In re
Carter indicates that "the consensus in articles on the subject indicates the
client to be the corporation and its board of directors." In re Carter and
Johnson 11979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,175 at p.
82,181.
76. For instance, a disclosure which has a short run adverse effect on
stock price may be of long run benefit to the corporation if it assists in driving out corrupt or incompetent management.
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ever, a thin line distinguishes a civil violation from conduct
which triggers criminal sanctions.
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 193477 describe criminal conduct as any willful violation of the substantive provisions of the
statutes. 78 Violations of the securities laws or any other action
that gives rise to material civil liability must be reported to the
SEC in periodic or extraordinary reports. 79 Under the 1934 Act's
continuous disclosure provisions, failure to report such actions
may result in criminal liability. 80 If the corporation is aware of a
past violation that gave rise to potential material civil liability,
but decides not to disclose it in current SEC filings, the corporation apparently intends to commit a crime. As a result, an attorney's awareness of the corporate client's intention not to
disclose the past civil wrong, triggers the permissive disclosure
clause of DR 4-101(C) (3).81 This result follows despite the apparent intention of the draftsmen of the provision to prevent dis82
closure of past crimes.
An additional consideration is the potential for conflict between DR 4-101 and SEC disclosure standards. DR 4-101 permits
the disclosure of a client's intent to commit a crime while
prohibiting disclosure of a client's past crime. Should the SEC
require attorneys to disclose their corporate client's past securities violations, as in National Student Marketing Corp., a conflict with DR 4-101 would result. While DR 4-101 prohibits
disclosure of past crimes, the SEC would compel disclosure;
and, while DR 4-101 permitted only the disclosure of the client's
intent to commit a crime, the SEC would compel disclosure of a
83
client's intent to commit a violation of a civil nature.
A possible means of averting this conflict comes from DR 4101(C) (2). That DR provides for an exception to the rule of confidentiality where disclosure is required by other DRs, by law,
or court order. Under this provision, the SEC disclosure standard could be treated as a disclosure required by law, thus
avoiding a conflict with DR 4-101.
77. See supra note 2.

78. 1933 Act, supra note 2, at § 24; 1934 Act, supra note 2, at § 32(a).
79. See supra note 6.
80. Id.
81. Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1411-12.
82. See MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 4-101(A) (B) and (C)(3).
83. I am aware of no authority that provides any indication of whether
the SEC recognizes any distinction between criminal and civil violations or
between past and future violations. However at least one commentator has
suggested that there is a potential conflict between the SEC and CPR positions: "[A] lawyer will often be able to escape SEC prosecution only by
disclosing securities violations which the Code requires him to keep confidential." Lipman, supra note 14, at 462.
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The CPR provisions elaborating upon Canon 7 are also relevant to any consideration of attorney responsibility. DR 7-102
states in part that:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon
his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal,
information is protected as a privileged
except when 8the
4
communication.
It is important to realize, initially, that the final clause, "except
when... privileged," drastically affects the applicability of the
provision.
"Privileged communications," here, means anything which
constitutes a confidence or secret under DR 4-101.85 Since DR 4101 imposes a duty of confidentiality with respect to confidences
and secrets, 86 the effect of the final clause is to limit the duty of
disclosure to information given the lawyer by someone other
than the client. The practical effect of this clause is to virtually
annihilate whatever duty is imposed by the balance of the
87
provision.
DR 7-102 (B) (1) also raises a definitional problem: what constitutes "fraud" for purposes of triggering the duty of disclosure? The problem arises because the securities laws go beyond
the common law definition of fraud which normally includes
some requirement of "scienter," i.e., intent to deceive. Under
the securities laws, it is often sufficient for the plaintiff to establish merely the existence of a material misstatement or omission
without proving the culpability of the defendant. 88 The ABA
Ethics Committee has declared that "fraud" under DR 7102(B) (1) means "active fraud with a requirement of scienter or
84.

MODEL CODE,

supra note 69, at DR 7-102(B) (1).

85. ABA Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 341, 61 A.B.A. J. 1543 (1975

[hereinafter cited as Opinion341]. It must be emphasized that "privileged"
is used here to refer to far more than what is protected by the attorneyclient privilege recognized in the law of evidence.
86. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 4-101(B).
87. Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MmN.
L. REV. 89, 110 (1977). The limiting clause was added to the official version
of the DR by amendment in 1974 but many states have not adopted the
amendment. Kramer, Client Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations, 67
GEo. L.J. 991, 994-95. This article indicates that of the six states which contain about half the lawyers in the U.S., only New York and Illinois have
adopted the amended version of the DR as modified by Opinion 341.
88. But see Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The question of whether this holding applies to SEC injunctive suits was expressly
left open. See also §§ 11, 12(2) of the 1933 Act which under some very limited circumstances allow the defendant an affirmative defense of lack of
scienter.
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intent to deceive."8 9
How the ABA's definition of fraud affects the obligation of a
securities lawyer is unclear. If the lawyer suspects that the
course of conduct being pursued by the client is unlawful and he
communicates his suspicion to the client, who refuses to modify
its plans, then it is at least arguable that active fraud is established. However, if the client's refusal to alter its plans is based
on a good faith belief that its actions will not violate the law, it is
questionable whether disregard of the lawyer's admonition
should be sufficient to justify a finding of intent to defraud.
A third provision under DR 7-102 (B) (1) requires that the client's fraud be "clearly established" before the duty to disclose is
enforced. 90 "Clearly established," under the DR, does not require objectively conclusive proof of fraud. However, the lawyer
must be virtually certain that the securities laws have been violated before the disclosure duty is triggered. The lawyer is not
required to act if he merely suspects or thinks it probable that
the client has committed a fraud.9 1
In the securities area it is extraordinarily difficult to apply
the "clearly established" standard without depriving the rule of
significance. For example, a misstatement or omission must be
"material," i.e., relevant to the analysis of a "reasonable investor"92 in order to constitute a securities violation. But obviously,

counsel could often plausibly argue that even a clear falsehood
was not material and, therefore, that fraud has not been clearly
established. Furthermore, accounting standards allow
enormous flexibility in the presentation of financial data. Thus,
many apparent falsehoods in financial statements could con89. Opinion 341, supra note 84.

90. Since the rule imposes two duties on the attorneys (attempting to
persuade the client to rectify the fraud and disclosing the fraud to the victim if the client will not do so) one wonders if the same degree of certainty
is required of the lawyer before both duties attach. It would seem logical to
require the lawyer to discuss the client's conduct with the client on somewhat less evidence of fraud than would be necessary to justify disclosure.
In any event, there is nothing to prohibit the lawyer from discussing his
suspicions with the client under any circumstances and good sense would
seem to dictate that the lawyer should confer with the client regarding the
possibility and implications of securities violations when the lawyer has
good reason to believe that a violation has occurred or is imminent.
91. Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MNN.
L. REV. 89, 107 (1977). In a Statement of Position approved by the ABA
House of Delegates it is claimed that the lawyer has "neither the obligation
nor the right to make disclosure when any reasonable doubt exists concerning the client's obligation of disclosure." Report of the ABA House of Delegates by the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 31 Bus.
LAw. 543, 545 (1975).
92. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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ceivably have some justification in generally accepted accounting principles.
Even if the lawyer is not permitted or required to disclose
the client's securities violations, he may have the option or the
duty to terminate the representation. The CPR addresses this
issue in several provisions. EC 7-8 permits the lawyer to resign
where the "client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a
course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of
the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary Rules. . .

."

With-

drawal is required by DR 2-110(B)(2) where "[the lawyer]
knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.

' 93

Thus it is clear that when

a client involves itself in a securities violation, contrary to the
lawyer's advice, the lawyer is at the very least permitted by the
CPR to resign.94
In summary, it is apparent that the CPR is basically antidisclosure. A Statement of Policy adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates makes this point quite explicit: "We do not believe
that the policy of disclosure as embodied in the SEC laws warrants an exception to the basic confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship. Such exceptions have to date been carefully
reserved by the CPR for far more critical and limited
'95
situations.
Short of disclosure, the CPR permits and may require the
lawyer to make some inquiry of his client where it appears possible or probable that the client has violated or intends to violate
the securities laws. Obviously the inquiry should first seek to
determine if a violation has occurred or will occur. Where it appears that the client's conduct constitutes a violation, the lawyer
is required by DR 7-102(B) (1) to prevail on the client to disclose
and rectify the violation itself. If it becomes apparent that the
client's conduct is unlawful 96 and there is time to avoid
93. There are other circumstances such as a nonpayment of fees and
bad faith prosecution of claims in which the lawyer is permitted or required
to resign. See MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 2-110(C)(1) (a), (f).
94. In most cases the lawyer's self interest would dictate that he resign
the representation (or at least cease handling securities matters for the client) simply to avoid personal entanglement in any litigation arising from
the client's conduct.
95. Statement of Policy Adopted by ABA Regarding Responsibilities
and Liabilitiesof Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by
Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAw. 543, 547 (1975).
96. MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 2-110(A) (2) prevents the lawyer
from withdrawing.
In any event,... until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client,. . . including giving due notice
to his client, allowing time for the employment of other counsel, deliv-
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prejudice to the client's interest,97 the CPR probably requires
the lawyer to resign. Where sufficient time is not available to
engage substitute counsel, turn over books and records, etc., the
CPR prohibits the lawyer from resigning without the client's
consent.
The Proposed Model Rules Of ProfessionalConduct

Because of gaps and ambiguities in the existing CPR, the
ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards has
been engaged in an effort to produce a new, more useful code of
responsibility. What follows is an analysis of the options and
obligations faced by the securities lawyer under the Final Draft
98
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).
Although the Model Rules have not yet been voted upon by the
ABA, 9 9 they are worthy of consideration here as representative
of the views of some of the leading authorities in the field.
One general observation that has been made about the implications of the proposed Model Rules for the practitioner's
conduct is that "[cIompleted crimes and frauds may not be disclosed under the model rules, with one narrow exception-when
the lawyer's services [are] used to consummate the unlawful
conduct." 100 It is unclear whether conduct that would be a completed offense but for the operation of the 1934 Act's continuous
disclosure system, described earlier, is considered a complete
crime or fraud under the Model Rules.
ering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled
and complying with applicable laws and rules.
Id. (emphasis added). Although it has been suggested that this provision
may not apply in a situation where the client disregards the lawyer's advice
regarding a proposed transaction, Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1395, the "in
any event" clause seems to make the provision universally applicable. This
provision reduces but does not totally eliminate the viability of this option
for the lawyer.
97. A problem arising from a decision to withdraw is whether the reasons for withdrawal must be communicated to the client's new counsel.
There seems to be no clear consensus on this issue. See Leiman, Responsibility to Report Securities Law Violations, 6 INST. ON SEC. REG. (PLI) 265,
278 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Leiman].
98. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft, 1980) [here-

inafter cited as

MODEL RULES].

99. The Model Rules will be considered by the ABA House of Delegates
at its August, 1982 meeting. The format for the Model Rules was voted on at
the ABA's mid-year meeting in January, 1982. The format selected is that
which was used by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards in its Final Draft of the Model Rules. 67 A.B.A.J. (pull-out section) (1981).
100. Kutak, Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Ethical Standardsfor
the 80's and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116, 1120 (1981).
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The Model Rules specifically address the special duties imposed on advisers of corporations in Rule 1.13. This provision
seeks to clarify the identity of the "client" in the corporate context. While Rule 1.13(a) reiterates the message of EC 5-18, that a
corporate attorney represents the organization as opposed to its
shareholders, officers, directors, etc., Rule 1.13(b) also provides
procedures and considerations for the lawyer to refer to where
the lawyer knows that a violation of the securities laws has or
will occur. The lawyer is instructed to "proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization."'' 1 The factors that the lawyer must consider when selecting his course of
action include: "the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation,
the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization con0 2
cerning such matters and any other relevant considerations.'
The course of action chosen should be designed to minimize
both disruption of the organization and the risk of leaking information. 0 3 Possible steps to be taken to effectuate this command include:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter; (2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and (3) referring the
matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest auact in behalf of the organization as determined by
thority that can1°4
applicable law.
If the lawyer is unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade the
organization's highest authority to abandon the action (or refusal to act) in question and the action or inaction is "clearly a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation
of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization,
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, 10 5 the lawyer is permitted by Rule 1.13(c) to take further
action believed to be in the organization's best interest. 0 6 This
authorization may encompass disclosure of information pertaining to the representation to persons outside the organization
only if the lawyer reasonably believes that: "(1) the highest authority in the organization has acted to further the personal or
financial interests of members of that authority which are in
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

RULEs, supra note 98, at Rule 1.13(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at Rule 1.13(c).
MODEL
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conflict with the interests of the organization; and (2) revealing
the information is necessary in the best interest of the
10 7
organization."'
What is interesting about this provision is the constant admonition that any action taken be in the "best interest of the
organization."' 10 8 Apparently, the lawyer has no independent
obligation under this provision to prevent the organization from
harming third parties. A provision explicitly releasing the lawyer from a duty to third persons was included in a prior draft of
the Model Rules. 10 9 Although that provision was omitted from
the final draft, its spirit appears to have survived. Thus, if the
lawyer is aware of a securities violation but feels that it is likely
to go undiscovered unless he discloses it, the correct response
may be for him not to disclose it. Disclosure would be contrary
to the interests of the only entity whose interest he is to consider, viz., the corporation. 110 A comparable provision in a preliminary draft was the subject of substantial criticism by former
SEC Chairman Williams who expressed the view that wrongful
activity, which may not seem to affect the client when it occurs,
often has a serious, unforeseen impact on the corporation at a
later date."'
With respect to the particular actions encompassed by Rule
1.13, the commentary to that Rule stresses that the lawyer must
not attempt to impinge on the client's authority to make final
decisions regarding matters of business policy. 112 Any duty to
oppose the decisions of the client attaches only where the lawyer has good reason to question the legality of corporate activity.
The lawyer's obligation to go over the head of the corporate official involved in the questionable activity depends on the severity of the consequences likely to ensue from the activity. 'Clear
justification' must exist for going over the head of the person
reasponsible for such activity." 3 The more serious the potential
wrongdoing, the higher in the corporate hierarchy the attorney
should go.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. "The lawyer's duty does not extend to third persons who may be
injured by wrongful acts of the organization." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 comment (Discussion Draft 1980).
110. The view that, in this context, the lawyer has no duty whatsoever to
the public markets seems rather surprising given the pressure placed on
the bar to recognize such a duty. Of course, the provision may also instruct
the lawyer to consider the long run benefit to the organization of exposing
corrupt management.
111. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,318, p. 82,374 (Oct. 4, 1979).
112. MODEL RULES, supra note 98, at Rule 1.13 comment.
113. Id.
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If referral to the client's governing body does not successfully resolve the matter, the commentary instructs the lawyer to
attempt to take remedial action without disclosing client confidences, e.g., by consulting the shareholders if a close corporation is involved. If such action cannot be taken, the commentary
indicates that the lawyer may take other action which entails
disclosure of the wrongdoing to persons outside the organization under the circumstances specified in Rules 1.13(c) (1) and
1.13(c) (2).
Finally, this provision apparently does not apply to past
wrongs since the lawyer's duty to take steps to prevent the
wrong is triggered by a finding that the organization's officer,
employee, etc. "is engaged in [or] intends .. . a violation of
law. ....-114 This seems to perpetuate the distinction made in
the existing CPR between past and future wrongs. Thus, a past
wrong which generated a material contingent liability which the
client does not intend to disclose in future SEC filings apparently triggers the lawyer's duty under this section of the Model
Rules.
The proposed Model Rules also contain a general provision
pertaining to attorney-client confidentiality. This provision
seems an attempt to improve upon the present CPR by clarifying the scope of the obligation of confidentiality when that obligation is superseded by other obligations. Rule 1.6(a) of the
Model Rules prohibits disclosures of information pertaining to
the representation of a client without the client's consent. Rule
1.6(b) permits disclosure of the information covered by Rule
necessary:
1.6(a) to the extent the lawyer believes
(2) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of another;
(3) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had
been used;
law.(5

to comply with the rules of professional conduct or other

It is important to realize that in the previous draft of the Model
Rules, the counterparts of Rules 1.6(b) (2) and 1.6(b) (5) were
mandatory. 1 6 Thus, the draftsmen seem to favor the interests
of the client over the interests of third parties, even where the

114. MODEL RULES, supra note 98, at Rule 1.13(b).
115. Id. at Rule 1.6(b).
116.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(Discussion Draft, 1979).

Rules 1.6(b) (2) & (b) (5)

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:373

physical safety of the third party is at stake. 1 7
Two observations about Rule 1.6 are salient to the present
analysis. First, there is an apparent inconsistency between
Rules 1.6 and 1.13. The latter does not authorize disclosure of
client information except if doing so is in the best interest of the
organization, while Rules 1.6(2) and (3) permit disclosure where
it is in the interest of those affected by the client's action. Obviously, there can be many situations in which the two interests
conflict. The commentary to Rule 1.6 recognizes that Rule 1.13
should be examined in conjunction with Rule 1.6 but does not
clearly indicate which prevails when they conflict." 8 Similarly,
the commentary to Rule 1.13 merely recognizes the potential interplay between Rules 1.13 and 1.6 but does not indicate whether
the lawyer's duty to his organizational client is of greater or
lesser importance than his right to warn third parties affected by
the client's unlawful activity." 9 It would seem that Rule 1.13 supersedes Rule 1.6 whenever the two conflict since this interpretation lends credence to the specific attempt of the draftsmen to
deal with the issue of the duty of advisers of organizations.
117. It is arguable that the lawyer should have a professional obligation to make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious bodily
injury which the lawyer knows is intended by a client. However, it is
very difficult for a lawyer to "know" when such a heinous purpose will
actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. To
requiredisclosurewhen the client intends such an act, at risk of disciplinary liability in the assessment of the client's purpose turns out to be
wrong, would be to impose a penal risk that might interefere with the
lawyer's resolution of an inherently diffcult moral dilemma.
MODEL RULES, supra note 98, at Rule 1.6 comment (emphasis added).

118. The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 1.13, 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 &4.1. In addition to these provisions, a
lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give
information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these
Rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession.
Id.

119. In particular, the responsibility to act for the best interest of the
organization under this Rule exists independently of the authority to
prevent legally wrongful conduct under Rule 1.6 or 3.3, the responsibilities to the client under Rules 1.8 and 1.16 and the responsibilities of the
lawyer under Rule 4.1. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the organization, Rule 1.2(d)
can be applicable. In connection with complying with Rule 1.2(d), 3.3.
or 4.1 or exercising the discretion conferred by Rule 1.6(b), a lawyer for
an organization may be in doubt whether the conduct will actually be
carried out and whether higher authority in the organization approves.
To guide his conduct under Rule 1.2(d), 3.3 or 4.1 or Rule 1.6(b), the
lawyer ordinarily should make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13(b).
Id. at Rule 1.13 comment.
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Second, Rule 1.6 could apply in situations that are relevant
for present purposes where Rule 1.13 is entirely inapplicable.
One situation might be where the lawyer's client is an individual
investor who proposes an unregistered sale of a block of securities that constitute "control shares." Another situation would
involve an individual investor who proposes to trade on undisclosed, material information.
A third observation is that Rule 1.6 represents a substantial
improvement over the existing CPR since it largely eliminates
the unmanageable distinctions drawn between crimes and
frauds and between past and future activites. Since both Rule
1.6(b) (2) and Rule 1.6(b) (3) apply to disclosures regarding criminal or fraudulent acts of the client, and since Rule 1.6(b) (2) refers to prevention of such acts and Rule 1.6(b) (3) refers to
rectification of the consequences of such acts, it is no longer necessary to determine whether the client's act involved a fraud or
a crime or whether it has occurred or will occur.120 However,
uncertainty remains as to the applicability of this provision in
the securities area.
A violation of the securities laws often does not require the
defendant to act with any particular state of mind, but "fraud" or
"fraudulent conduct" under the Model Rules includes only "conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant
information. 1' 2 1 Query, whether a client's failure to correct a
material misstatement or omission which was not originally the
product of deceptive intent, is within the Model Rule's definition
of fraud.
The commentary associated with Rule 1.6 tells us two
things. First, it states the overall policy judgment underlying
the provision:
A rule governing disclosure of threatened harm thus involves balancing the interests of one group of potential victims against those
of another. On the assumption that lawyers generally fulfill their
duty to advise against the commission of deliberately wrongful
acts, the public is better protected122
if full disclosure by the client is
encouraged than if it is inhibited.
Clearly, Rule 1.6 opposes disclosure except in very serious cases
and, even then, disclosure is merely permissive. Secondly, the
commentary specifies the facts that should be considered by the
attorney in deciding what to do when disclosure of client wrongdoing is permitted. The lawyer is instructed to consider, "[his]
120. Compare MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 4-101(B) & (C) with DR
7-102(B) (1).
121. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 98, Terminology.
122. Id. at Rule 1.6 comment.
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knowledge about and relationship to the conduct in question,
23
and the seriousness of that conduct."'
Closely related to the lawyer's right to reveal certain of his
client's wrongful acts is his duty to avoid assisting the client in
such acts. The proposed Model Rules specifically impose such a
duty. Rule 1.2(d) provides that:
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent,
or in the preparation of a written instrument containing terms the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know are legally prohibited,
but a lawyer may counsel or assist a client in a good faith effort to
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.124
This provision comes into play where the lawyer discovers during the course of his representation that the client's conduct,
with respect to a particular transaction, is criminal or fraudulent. 25 The commentary makes clear that this provision requires the lawyer to withdraw from the representation if his
continued involvement assists the client's unlawful activity.
However, the lawyer's obligation may go beyond mere resignation to actual disclosure of the client's activity. The commentary associated with Rule 1.6 indicates that Rule 1.2(d) requires
disclosure where silence constitutes assisting the client in his
126
unlawful enterprise.
The commentary to Rule 1.2(d) elaborates upon the proposition by noting that steps beyond resignation (of which the most
likely is public disclosure) may be required if "the lawyer knows
that despite the withdrawal the client is continuing in conduct
that is criminal or fraudulent, and is making use of the fact that
the lawyer had been involved in the matter.' 27 Although the
commentary states that action beyond resignation may be required, the context of the statement indicates that "may" should
be read as "shall" because the next sentence states that "[iun
other situations not involving such assistance, the lawyer has
discretion to make disclosure of otherwise confidential informa28
tion in accordance with Rule 1.6(b)."'
In the securities context, the disclosure obligation imposed
by Rule 1.2(d) would seem to attach, inter alia, in situations
where the lawyer has given an opinion that was necessary for
the consummation of the client's unlawful transaction, even if
123. Id.
124. Id. at Rule 1.2(d).

125. As in the case of Rule 1.6 there is a question as to how the "fraudulent" language would apply in the securities context.
126. MODEL RULES, supra note 98, at Rule 1.6 comment.
127. Id. at Rule 1.2 comment.
128. Id.
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the opinion itself is still valid. Of course, any disclosure obligation imposed by Rule 1.2 (d) would attach only where the lawyer
learns or should learn of the client's unlawful activity at a time
when the consequences of such activity can be prevented.
The command of Rule 1.2(d) and the associated commentary is supplemented and explained by Rule 4.1(b) (2): In the
course of representing a client a lawyer shall not:
(b) knowingly fail to disclose a fact to a third person when:
(2) disclosure is necessary to prevent assisting a crimi129
nal or fraudulent act, as required by Rule 1.2(d);
The commentary pertaining to this provision indicates that
it comes into play only when the lawyer becomes aware that the
client's unlawful activity has rendered a prior statement by the
130
lawyer untrue.
However, statements made by the chairman of the ABA
Committee that produced the Model Rules suggest that the duty
imposed by Rule 4.1 is a more general one. In particular, and of
special relevance to the securities practitioner, it is suggested
that the duty attaches during negotiation of a business transaction whenever disclosure is necessary to avoid assistance of the
client's crime or fraud.' 3 1 It is, furthermore, suggested by the
same commentator, that the NSMC case prompted articulation
of the duties imposed by Rule 4.1. Significantly, the above comments indicate that Rule 4.1 imposes a disclosure obligation
upon the lawyer whenever disclosure is necessary to avoid
assistance of the client's crime or fraud and not merely when
the validity of the lawyer's own statement is jeopardized by the
132
client's actions.
129. Id. at Rule 4.1(b)(2).
130. This Rule governs representations by a lawyer. A related but distinct duty exists under Rule 1.2(d), which forbids a lawyer to assist a
client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. The critical elements
under Rule 1.2(d) are the nature of the client's purpose, whether the
lawyer knew of the purpose and whether the lawyer assisted in carrying it out. In contrast, the critical elements under this Rule are the
making of a statement by the lawyer and the lawyer's knowledge that
the statement is false.
Id. at Rule 4.1 comment.
131. Under the model rules, therefore, a lawyer is under a duty to disclose not fraud in general, as D.R. 7-102(B) would require, but those
facts necessary to avoid assisting an ongoing or prospective criminal or
fraudulent transaction. This duty may become operative in a business
transaction, for example, during negotiations (Rule 4.1) ....

Kutak, Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Ethical Standardsfor the 80's
and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116, 1120 (1981).
132. Rule 4.1 furthermore requires disclosure only when it is "necessary to prevent" assisting a criminal or fraudulent act. Thus, in some
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The attorney also confronts the decision of whether he
should withdraw from representation of the client who is involved in a securities violation. Of course as indicated earlier,
Rule 1.2(d) sometimes requires resignation. 133 Assuming, however, that Rule 1.2(d) does not compel resignation, a lawyer is
permitted to withdraw by Rule 1.16(b) if "withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client, or if: . . . the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent .... ,,134 The commentary
makes clear that these conditions are in the alternative, i.e., if
the client engages in illegal activity the lawyer is free to resign
135
even if doing so results in material prejudice to the client.
This formulation eliminates the ambiguity of the existing CPR.
At least one question, however, remains: does "persists in a
course of action ... that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent"'136 trigger the withdrawal option only after illegal conduct has occurred or is the lawyer free to resign when
he becomes aware of the client's intention to pursue an illegal
course of conduct?
In summary, it appears that the Model Rules have the following implications for the securities practitioner:
1) he must prevail upon the individual who appears to be
responsible for the unlawful activity in the first instance in an
effort to dissuade him from committing the violation;
2) he must refuse to provide any legal services that appear
likely to contribute to the success of the unlawful scheme;
3) he must refer the matter upward if attempts to resolve
it with the source are unsuccessful;
4) he must resign the representation if the client refuses to
discontinue the unlawful activity and his continued involvement
assists the client in such activity;
5) after he resigns he must disclose the client's wrongdoing if the client is making use of his prior involvement to continue the unlawful activity;
cases, withdrawal may suffice to prevent that assistance. Perhaps illustrative is Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student

Marketing Corporation,457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). The operative
terms of Rule 4.1 also indicate that, in a corporate context, outside disclosure will not be "necessary" if there is an opportunity to intercept
the conduct within the corporate hierarchy.
Id.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
Id. at Rule 1.16(b)(1).
Id. at Rule 1.16 comment.
Id. at Rule 1.16(b)(1).
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6) whether or not he resigns, he may disclose the client's
(or former client's) wrongdoing if the criteria contained in Rules
1.6(b) (2), (3) or (5) or 1.13(c) (1) and (2) are satisfied.
Proposalof the Institute for Public Representation
The final source of authority to be dealt with in this section
of the paper is the proposal of the Institute for Public Representation at Georgetown University for an amendment to SEC Rule
2(e). 137 The proposed amendment, which applies to all reporting companies, requires the company to include in its Form 10137. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981). The Institute actually made 2 proposals
to the SEC, one of which would impose an obligation of disclosure on attorneys, was not promulgated for public comment by the SEC. What follows
are the relevant provisions of the proposal that was published for public
comment by the SEC.
The full text of the relevant provisions of the proposal appears below:
1. Every corporation required to fie reports with the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("reporting corporation") shall include in
its Form 10-K and in its annual report to shareholders a certificate stating that:
(A) Its board of directors has instructed each attorney employed or retained by the corporation to report promptly to the board
either directly or through the audit committee or some other committee
of the board with a similar ratio of independent directors, any corporate
activities discovered by the attorney through reasonable diligence during the course of representation which, in the attorney's opinion, violate
or probably violate any law administered or enforced by the SEC or any
other law, where such violations or probable violations
(i) could result in material financial liability to the
corporation;
(ii) call into question the quality and integrity of management in connection with corporate activity; or
(iii) are part of a pattern or practice of recurring activity;
(B) All attorneys have indicated their compliance with the
board's instructions either by reporting such violations or probable violations, or by reporting, at least annually, that no such violations or
probable violations have come to their attention;
(C) The full board of directors has considered each attorney's
report and has taken all actions determined to be appropriate;
(D) Information regarding such violations or probable violations has been conveyed to the independent auditors if, in the opinion
of the board, the violations or probable violations are material ....
3. When a reporting corporation's general counsel or any attorney
retained in connection with matters pertaining to the laws administered or enforced by the Commission resigns or is dismissed the corporation shall ifie with the Commission Form 8-K, describing the
circumstances of the resignation or dismissal. Prior to submission of
the Form 8-K to the Commission the corporation shall provide the resigning or dismissed attorney with an opportunity to comment on the
accuracy and completeness of the description. The attorney's comments shall become part of the corporation's submission to the
Commission.
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fxn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82, 144, pp. 82,050-51.
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and in its annual report to shareholders, representations to
the effect that each attorney employed or retained by the company has been instructed to report promptly to the board of directors any violations (or probable violations) of law discovered
by the attorney through reasonable diligence. Attorney's reports would be required if the violations "could result in material financial liability for the corporation; call into question the
quality and integrity of management ... or are part of a pattern
or practice of recurring activity."' 3 9 Compliance would require
that the full board had considered each attorney's report and
take "all actions determined to be appropriate," and that "information regarding such violations or probable violations had
been conveyed to the independent auditors if, in the opinion of
140
the board, the violations or probable violations are material.'
Furthermore, the Institute would require the circumstances
prompting the resignation or dismissal of an attorney advising
the corporation with respect to any laws administered by the
141
SEC to be described on a Form 8-K.
Several aspects of this proposal are worthy of comment.
First, it comes into play only after a violation occurs. The proposal appears to impose no obligation to prevent the violation.
Secondly, the requirement that the auditors be informed of the
violation applies only to the board; the lawyer has satisfied his
obligation by informing the board of the violation. The attorney's actual responsibility under the proposal may be somewhat
incongruous with the Institute's view of the corporate lawyer's
client. The former director of the Institute has expressed the
view that "what the code of professional responsibility says is
that the lawyer's responsibility is to the corporate entity. What
that ought to mean is that he is responsible to shareholders, the
board, and management, and also that he has a special obligation to the general public as well." 42 Although the Institute has
adopted an expansive view of the corporate lawyer's client, the
proposal it makes does not attempt to impose an extraordinarily
broad duty on the lawyer since there is no duty to do anything
before a wrong is committed and, in any event, the lawyer does
not have any duty of public disclosure. 43
138. See supra note 6.
139. [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82, 144, at p. 82,050
(July 25, 1979).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 82,144, pp. 82,050-52.
142. Chicago Tribune, December 16, 1979, § 5 at 3.
143. Although it could be argued that this proposal does not represent
the full scope of the duty that the Institute wishes to see imposed on a lawyer since it did make a proposal to require lawyers to make public disclosure of corporate wrongdoing, the following statement of the Institute's
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The Institute's proposal is unique in its simplicity. The lawyer does not have to assess a myriad of factors before deciding
what to do as he would under the Model Rules or the CPR. Even
so, it has been alleged that the implementation and monitoring
of the proposal by large law firms would be very difficult. 14
POLIcY ANALYSIS

Having discussed alternate approaches to attorney responsibility, it is necessary to examine the policy considerations
which underlie the standards recommended by the authorities.
The frequently articulated arguments, along with those considered relevant by this author, but not significantly explored elsewhere is discussed in the following sections. Most of the
controversy revolves around the disclosure dilemma. Accordingly, that issue is of predominant concern in the following
discussion.
Frequently Articulated Arguments
Opposing the Imposition of a Duty of Disclosure
The principal argument against extending a disclosure requirement to securities attorneys is that such a rule would discourage clients, fearful of being "turned in," from confiding fully
in their attorneys. This argument proceeds on two levels. First,
it is claimed that discouraging the client from disclosing all relevant facts would encourage, rather than prevent, securities violations by depriving the lawyer of the opportunity to persuade
the client not to violate the law. Second, this argument considers the harm to the client who is unable to benefit from its lawyer's fully informed advice. The client's interest would be
especially prejudiced if effective representation in pending litigation depended upon the lawyer's knowledge of prior events
which, if disclosed, could implicate the client in additional litigation. A client in such a position is not apt to divulge all the facts
to its lawyer; the client's immediate interests are thus
prejudiced.
With respect to the first argument, it has been suggested
that a duty of disclosure might discourage clients from seeking
director suggests that this proposal does represent the Institute's current

view where management has rebuffed the lawyer's opinion that a given
course of action is illegal:
Now what the lawyer should do next is very much up in the air, and our
proposal is that the lawyer has a duty at that point to inform the board
of directors of this illegal conduct and make sure that they are aware of
it. Then the board of directors can take such action as they think
appropriate.
Id.
144. Id. (comments contained in published account of dual interview of

Mr. Halperin and Mr. Sommer).
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legal assistance. 145 This situation arises, e.g., in the preparation
of formal SEC filings. No statute directs lawyers to prepare
such documents. If lawyers are required to inform the SEC of
securities violations, many companies
will simply have
146
nonlawyers handle this function.
Similarly, a duty of disclosure would inhibit a client's willingness to confide in counsel in a case where a previous wrong,
if detected, would create a contingent liability. If the client discusses the past actions with counsel who concludes that a wrong
did take place, and that disclosure of the violations is required,
the client must either agree to disclose the wrong in its next
SEC filing or counsel would be obligated to reveal the client's
intention to violate the law by its refusal to report the previous
wrongs. 147 Confiding in counsel virtually guarantees a lawsuit
where otherwise none might have been brought. Given these
circumstances, a client would be less than candid when consulting counsel. 148
The argument that lawyer-client confidentiality facilitates
the prevention of wrongful conduct hinges on two factors:
(1) the willingness of clients to confide fully in the lawyer under
145. In the particular area of the securities laws, if the client does not
believe that the lawyer-client privilege will be respected, it is a virtual
certainty that the conversations between the client and the lawyer will
not take place at all, or at least will not take place with the lawyer for
the corporation who sees to the disclosure documents .... As a result

society will be deprived of the vital opportunities in hard cases to stop
violations before they occur.
Leiman, supra note 97, at 275-76.
146. "The lawyer is not indispensable as the preparer of SEC disclosure
documents .... Consequently, a public company, faced with the choice of
employing a competent but potentially disloyal lawyer or a less competent
but completely loyal administrative assistant, may very well dispense with
the lawyer's more costly services." Lipman, supra note 13, at 469. Given the
complexity of today's securities laws and the often huge liabilities that can
be incurred for a violation it seems at least questionable whether corporations would attempt to prepare their disclosure documents totally without
legal assistance. In any event, market forces would be likely to require the
use of counsel in the preparation of documents used as part of a public offering of securities. Cf.Lome, The Corporate and Securities Advisor, The
Public Interest and Professional Ethics, 76 MicH. L. REv. 432, 470 (1978).
Still, it would seem that some routine documents such as 10-K and 10-Q
reports could be prepared exclusively by lay personnel.
147. Such a possibility is not of merely esoteric significance. Former
SEC Commissioner Pollack has argued that in such a situation (title defect
on major part of corporate assets on which statute of limitations will soon
run) the lawyer should be and is required to ensure disclosure. Cohen,
Wheat, Henderson, ProfessionalResponsibility-The CorporateBar 4 INST.
ON SEC. REG. (PLI) 181, 235 (1973).
148. Where counsel is not apprised of the facts regarding the client's ac-

tivities it is obviously impossible for him to intervene to prevent future
harm:

Were corporate managers to feel that their attorneys were no longer
entitled to act in their traditional role of confidential counselor to corporate clients, they might be less inclined to communicate with their at-
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a regime of confidentiality and, (2) the likelihood that the lawyer will be able to dissuade the client from committing securities violations. Even if the assurance of confidentiality induces
the client to reveal his intention to violate the securities laws,
confidentiality serves to prevent violations only if the client is
willing to heed the lawyer's admonition to refrain from the
wrongful conduct. It has been asserted that lawyers are frequently successful in dissuading their client from engaging in
1 49
wrongful conduct.
The argument, however, falls short in two respects. First, in
many of the cases in which the attorney has been able to persuade the client to abandon a proposed course of action, the attorney did so despite legitimate arguments favoring the legality
of the conduct. The existence of a good faith ground for believing that the client's conduct is legitimate would release the lawyer from the obligation to disclose the client's activities. The
attorney and client may simply conclude, however, that the anticipated cost of pursuing the course of conduct, e.g. investigations, publicity, litigation costs, fines and judgments, exceeds
the expected benefits of pursuing the transaction. Even under a
disclosure regime, attorney and client could investigate the legality of the proposed transaction in a straightforward manner.1 50 Thus the obligation of disclosure would not have
prevented the communication unless the client erroneously perceived that the proposed course of conduct was utterly indefensible. Since clients are normally not familiar with the law, it is
possible that such an erroneous perception will impede communication between lawyer and client.
Second, it is questionable whether clients who intend to
perpetrate obvious securities violations, i.e., those which would
clearly trigger the disclosure rule, will refrain merely because
the lawyer so advises. Clearly, such a client is not likely to need
a legal opinion to alert it to the fact that it proposes to break the
torneys and become overly cautious about what they would reveal. The
end result might then be less, rather than more disclosure of material
information.
Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and States Securities
Laws: Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CAL L. REv. 1189, 1227

(1973).
149. Leiman, supra note 97, at 276. However, if we assume that there is a
high level of candor in this relation, then the existence of the permissive

disclosure provision in the CPR (DR 4-101(C) (3)) may undercut the argument. If clients are willing to disclose all relevant information to their attorneys when it is at least possible that they will disclose their involvement in
a securities violation, one questions whether obligatory disclosure would
drastically decrease candor.
150. Of course, if the client erroneously perceived that the proposed
course of conduct was utterly indefensible, a disclosure obligation could
deny the lawyer the opportunity to dissuade the client from such course of
conduct.
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law. Certainly there are some individuals and corporations, who
because of their unfamiliarity with the securities laws, unwittingly involve themselves in blatant violations. The intervention
of counsel would presumably prevent violations in such cases.
The intervetnion of counsel would also prevent violations where
a client realizes the illegality of an activity but not its gravity.
There may also be situations where the intention of one employee (of the client) to violate the law is not known to the other
employees.
The validity of the argument, that confidentiality promotes
adherence to the law, depends on the existence of a significant
number of cases in which counsel is able to prevent his client
from engaging in a transaction that would otherwise be necessary for counsel to report under a regime of disclosure. Although it is not possible to obtain empirical evidence of the
number of such cases, there may well be fewer than originally
supposed.
Nevertheless, even without its claimed social benefits, lawyer-client candor and guaranteed confidentiality permit the client to benefit from the lawyer's fully informed judgment. As
clients become aware of their lawyers' disclosure duty, they
may become reluctant to convey information. Without relevant
information, the lawyer may be unable either to insure that the
client remains within the law or to give the client informed
15 1
advice.
Disclosure of past wrongdoing to counsel may sometimes be
to the client's advantage when he is involved in litigation. Such
knowledge can avoid inconsistent representations and surprise
as a result of any tactics or evidence employed by the opposition. It is arguable, however, that at the most, this argument
would serve to justify excluding lawyers, acting as advocates,
from the scope of the duty to reveal client securities violations. 152 This is the approach proposed by former Commis151. Note, The Duties and Obligations of the Securities Lawyer: The Beginning of a New Standardfor the Legal Profession? 1975 DuKIE L.J. 121, 14243; see also Gruenbaum, supra note 16, at 817 (client unwillingness to make
full disclosure to counsel could "impede effective legal representation").
152. See supra note 17.
On a more general level, "it has been pointed out that most of the SEC's
proceedings against lawyers have involved lawyers acting as advisers
rather than as advocates." Gruenbaum, supra note 16, at 802.
A second justification that is often asserted for compelling the SEC lawyer to work for the government rather than for his or her client is the
notion that there is an essential distinction between the litigating attorney and the office attorney. What that argument ignores is that our legal system is basically an adversarial one, and every lawyer-whether
drafting a contract, counseling in a business venture, writing a will or
performing any other service on behalf of a client-acts in such a way
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sioner Sommer and possibly adopted by the SEC (in that both
proceedings initiated by the SEC were against lawyers who
were not acting as advocates in connection with the objectionable transaction). In response it has been argued that it is a misnomer to distinguish between "advisers" and "advocates" for
purposes of defining the scope of the attorney's duty to reveal
client securities violations. This contention is based on the notion that every action performed by a lawyer on behalf of his
client in a so-called advisory context is intended to militate in
the client's favor in case of litigation arising from the transaction
in question.
Although this response certainly has substantial force, one
point should be noted in rebuttal. It is not entirely clear that
simply because an attorney seeks to protect his client's interest
in possible future litigation, his need for information pertaining
to the client's past transgressions is exactly the same as it would
be if he actually represented the client in present litigation.
Apart from the anticipated decline in client candor, the
quality of the lawyer's advice may be adversely affected by the
imposition of a duty to disclose his client's securities violations.
Such a duty potentially imposes personal responsibility on the
lawyer for the client's misdeeds.
It has been argued that requiring the lawyer to shoulder
such personal responsibility will induce him to place his own
interests ahead of the client's. The concern is that the lawyer,
understandably wanting to play it safe, may steer the client
away from perfectly legal actions in order to avoid a decision as
to whether disclosure is necessary. 153 To the extent that this
tendency causes the lawyer to prevail upon the client to reject
courses of action that are clearly illegal, the societal interest is
well served. The problem arises where a client's proposed action appears to the lawyer to be on the borderline between legality and illegality. If the conduct is found to be illegal, and the
lawyer did not disclose it, the lawyer may be sanctioned. On the
other hand, if the conduct was legal, and the lawyer publicly accused the client of a violation, the lawyer has violated his fiduciary obligation to the client. Thus, the lawyer has an incentive to
steer the client away from transactions not clearly illegal in order to avoid the disclosure dilemma. 154
as to protect the client from being at a disadvantage in potential future
litigation.
Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities Regulation, 35 Omo ST.
LJ. 280, 287-88 (1974).
153. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
154. The ABA has adopted the following view:
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The question becomes whether the SEC could disagree with
the attorney's judgment regarding the defensibility of a course
of conduct. Often, the answer is yes. The securities law is normally in a state of flux with issues that appear muddled one year
resolved the next. Accordingly, conduct that may be borderline
when proposed may be viewed as a gross violation when considered later by the SEC or a court. Indeed, subsequent decisions
which clearly establish the illegality of the client's conduct and
which are published before the attorney is consulted could be
construed as notice to the attorney of the illegality of the client's
conduct, thus triggering the duty of disclosure. 5 5
Even in relatively well settled areas of the securities law, it
may be difficult for the attorney to determine with certainty,
whether a particular transaction is proscribed. But assuming
that there is at least room for argument, the SEC is not likely to
ignore an attorney's good-faith determination that conduct is legal. If counsel can point to a nonfrivolous argument in the client's favor, he need not fear personal liability if the client,
apprised of the risks, goes ahead with the proposed transaction.
Counsel may, however, not wish to risk testing the validity
of his argument. It would be less risky simply to emphasize the
risks of the proposed action in hopes of inducing the client to
refrain from acting. Doing so eliminates the risks, for the lawyer, of SEC prosecution and of losing the client if he feels compelled at some point to go to the SEC. Even assuming that there
are social benefits associated with reducing the number of borderline transactions, the substantive law would be a better way
of deterring these transactions. It is simply inappropriate for
the client, who stands to profit if he can legally consummate his
transaction in the manner intended, to be influenced by the perThe client's actions should not be improperly narrowed through the insistence of an attorney who may, perhaps unconsciously, eliminate
available choices from consideration because of his concern over possible personal risks if the position is taken which, though supportable, is
subject to uncertainty or contrary to a known, but perhaps erroneous,
position of the SEC or a questionable lower court decision.
Report to the ABA House of Delegates from the Section of Corporation,

Banking and Business Law, 31 Bus. LAw. 543, 545 (1975). See also Myers,

The Attorney-Client Relationshipand the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Suggested Attorney Liabilityfor Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L REV. 1113, 1117

(1976).
155. A situation similar to the one described did exist several years ago
in connection with the definition of a private offering. In relatively short
order, the courts (especially the 5th Circuit), became significantly less lenient in allowing defendants to claim the benefits of the exemption. Had the
question of what constituted a private offering been presented to a practitioner before all of the cases in the line had been decided, he would have
faced the problem referred to in the text.
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sonal interest of the lawyer. The client should be permitted to
independently of his lawassume the risk in a borderline case,
56
yer's, possibly biased, influence.
Supporting the Imposition of a Duty of Disclosure
It has often been argued that because the SEC lacks the resources to completely police the securities markets, it is necessary to enlist the services of the securities bar to force
compliance with the securities laws. The rationale is that since
lawyers are often essential in securities transactions, if the lawyer is aware that he may be personally liable if a transaction
violates the law, he will do his utmost to ensure that the client
either complies with the law or mitigates harms attributable to
violations the lawyer could not prevent. This would free the
SEC to use its limited enforcement resources to fully police lawover
yers and accountants, rather than spreading its resources
157
participants.
market
direct
of
group
larger
much
the
This argument is, however, virtually indefensible. There
seems little reason to accord any greater significance to the
needs of the SEC than to the needs of any other law enforce156. One commentator has recognized the social desirability of not having the lawyer impinge on the client's decisionmaking authority: "[We
must recognize] the interest of clients and of society in having ultimate
decisionmaking authority rest with the client. It is important to recognize
society's interest in having decisions made by the persons who will receive
their primary economic benefits or burdens." Lorne, The Corporateand Securities Adviser, The Public Interes4 and ProfessionalEthics, 76 MicH. L.
REV. 425, 487 (1978).

157. Stanley Sporkin has indicated that this rationale is what prompted
the SEC to begin its effort to make securities lawyers police the activities of
their clients:
A crooked deal, a shady deal, a bad deal, call it what you like, isn't a
deal unless it has access to the marketplace, and this access can be provided only by the professionals. We can't watch 15,000 brokers, but we
sure as hell can watch the people they use. Cut it down that way, you
have a smaller universe to police.
We started by saying, in effect, "You people, you lawyers and you
accountants, you are going to be held responsible when you put your
name on paper that comes to this commission for filing." Now right
away this doubles or triples your enforcement staff, because they must
take measures so they are not unwitting participants in a bad deal.
J. GOULDEN, THE MILLION DouAR LAWYERS, at 144 (1977).
The SEC has made the same point in more formal fashion in a Rule
2(e) proceeding against an attorney. In re Emanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,407, p. 83,172 (June-18, 1973) (securities bar has major responsibility for enforcing the federal securities laws
because of the SEC's limited resources). Requiring the lawyer to disclose
also helps the SEC in its task of preventing harm to investors where the
client cannot be dissuaded from violating the law, i.e., the disclosure serves
to warn potential victims of the client's violation.
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ment body.15 8 It seems ridiculous to make the duties of lawyers
vary with the extent of congressional largesse to the SEC. Extending this argument to its logical conclusion suggests that if
the SEC enforcement budget is increased there is less need for
159
attorneys to be held responsible for their client's activities.
Such an argument falls of its own weight.
A more plausible argument is that imposition of a duty of
disclosure will deter client violations. The client is less likely to
engage in illegal conduct if a disclosure requirement reduces the
possibility that the unlawful scheme will succeed. 160 A major
consideration is whether a disclosure duty will deter unlawful
activity altogether, or merely prompt the client to effect his
fraudulent schemes without the lawyer's knowledge.
Since the lawyer is not indispensable in many securities
transactions,' 6' disclosure requirements may simply induce clients to proceed without the lawyer's assistance. However, given
the complexity of securities law, it is doubtful that many major
securities transactions could be effected without the advice of
counsel. Therefore, requiring disclosure would probably prevent some violations.
Other actions could be taken to deter violations including an
increase in the civil and criminal penalties imposed on violators. 162 Also, making private suits easier to win and more profit-

able for successful plaintiffs would provide an incentive for
158. In responding to the SEC argument of resource inadequacy after it
has advanced in the Fields case, Dean Freedman declared, "I have heard
the same justification given in virtually every case of police abuse and every
prosecutorial circumvention of constitutional rights with which I have been
involved." Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 280, 281 (1974). Undoubtedly, lawyers would be of assist-

ance to the police in getting violent criminals off the streets if, in contrast to
existing law, the admission of highly relevant but illegally obtained evidence were permitted in criminal prosecutions. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). However, lawyers are unwilling to let the demonstrable needs of the
police outweigh the other implicated interests.
159. "Surely, the ethical obligations of the legal profession should not be
varied from year to year depending on the vicissitudes of congressional generosity to the SEC." Lipman, supra note 14, at 465.
160. This position has also been urged as both an explanation of the
SEC's activities in this area, Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Self
Regulation of the Securities Lawyer, 32 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 597, 600 (1975),

and an independent justification for such a policy. Note, Client Fraudand
the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89, 117 (1977).
161. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
162. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1--7 (1976), approach of awarding a large multiple of actual damages to successful civil
plaintiffs would both encourage private suits and directly deter violations
by increasing the risks of loss that must be borne by those intending to
violate the securities laws. Similarly, the substantive standards governing
liability under the securities laws could be modified to facilitate recovery by
private plaintiffs. For example, Congress could overrule Ernst & Ernst v.
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private plaintiffs (and the plaintiffs' securities bar) to seek out
and prosecute violations. Accordingly, if the imposition of personal liability on the securities bar is to be justified as a deterrent, there must be some showing that imposing such liability
will have a significantly greater deterrent effect than any alternate measures. Notably, it is only in the securities area that
there has been a proposal to modify the standards governing
163
lawyers' behavior as a means of deterring client misconduct.
While it can be argued that counsel is better able to force
clients to obey the securities law because he has more information about the client's activities, this factor may not be important. Many securities frauds involve the nondisclosure of
164
adverse information regarding the client's business fortunes.
Such information will often be made public when the client's
deteriorating finances bring the concealed crisis to a head, e.g.,
when obligations can no longer be met or independent investigations are launched. Not coincidently, in both of the cases used
by the SEC to formulate a standard of conduct for the securities
bar, 165 the client wrongdoing was eventually disclosed despite
counsel's silence. If it is likely that violations will surface without disclosure requirements, then the deterrent effect of imposing such a duty would be reduced.
A third argument frequently invoked to justify a disclosure
duty is that the investing public relies on the securities bar to
protect its interest to such an extent that it is appropriate to impose special obligations on this section of the bar.166 This argument states that because lawyers play a pivotal role in many
securities transactions, the public should and does count on the
lawyer to ensure the legality of the transaction.
This argument prompts two responses. First, it is questionable whether the investing public really views the lawyer as a
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and allow recovery of damages under
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act on a showing of negligent misrepresentation.
163. See infra pp. 420-24.

164. E.g., In re Carter and Johnson, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,847, p. 84,145 (Feb. 28,1981); SEC v. National Student Mktg.
Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360 (1972).
165. Id.
166. The claim has been made that, "[t]oday, lawyers play an indispensable and essential role in the affairs of corporations. In this regard, the
advice of lawyers often determines whether any particular transaction will
occur, and if it does, then with whom, at what price, and where it will occur." Gruenbaum, supra note 16, at 527. On a more specific note, "[a former] SEC staff member has argued that lawyers have a more general duty
to perform a due diligence investigation because the public relies on the

names of lawyers which appear in prospectuses and other disclosure documents as a kind of surety for the securities which they purchase." Lipman,
supra note 14, at 466.
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guarantor. It has been argued that many investors do not even
read prospectuses and, therefore, could not be relying on the
representations of the attorney named therein to ensure their
truthfulness. 16 7 Presumably, other disclosure documents receive no more attention than prospectuses. Second, even if investors do feel that the securities lawyer is guaranteeing full
compliance with the law, such reliance is misplaced. Few would
claim that because most warranties on consumer goods are
drafted by lawyers such warranties are certain to be entirely fair
to consumers. Similarly, few would believe that a corporate
merger was not anticompetitive simply because a lawyer was instrumental in the negotiations leading to it. The lawyer is, after
all, retained and paid by the client to protect the client's interest
and, therefore, it is unrealistic for the public to rely upon the
lawyer to place the public interest ahead of the client's
168
interest.
In response, it is argued that even if it is not reasonable to
assume that lawyers act to ensure the legality of client activities,
the lawyer's key role in the preparation of information about issuers justifies the imposition of such a responsibility on him in
the future, because he is in the best position to prevail upon the
client to comply with the law. This argument presupposes that
securities lawyers are not already making substantial efforts to
see that clients comply with the law. It would not be rational for
the public to rely on the securities bar as guarantors of the accuracy of all representations made in connection with the sale of
securitiies. If the public can currently count on securities attorneys to actively discourage proposed illegal conduct of which
they are aware, accordingly, it is unnecessary to impose special
enforcement duties on securities attorneys unless the vindication of unjustified, unprecedented, and possibly nonexistent
public expectations is desired.
If lawyers are already making efforts to ensure the legality
of client activities, then the addition of a duty of disclosure
seems to serve only the purpose of deterrence of client wrongdoing. A.A. Sommer, Jr. has expressed the view that the securities
bar is presently making an affirmative effort to see that clients
comply with the law.
I don't know of a security or a corporate lawyer who, if he were
aware of the fact that management was doing something illegal,
told them that it was illegal and told them to stop it and they re167. Lipman, supra note 14, at 466.
168. This viewpoint does not, of course, amount to instructing the lawyer
to disregard the public interest when counseling his clients, but merely that
any existing public expectations that the lawyer is a guarantor of client representations are unjustified.
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fused... I don't know of any corporate lawyer of any standing who
wouldn't then go to the board of directors and say, "Look, fellows,
you've got a problem." I don't think there's been a very good case
corporate lawyers today are not fulfilling
made for the idea that
169
their responsibilities.
Arguments Not Extensively Explored Elsewhere
The difficulty of identifying reportable violations is a factor
militating against the imposition of a disclosure duty. All the
proposals which seek to require disclosure are triggered not by
the lawyer's reasonable belief that certain conduct violates the
law, but by a considerably more rigorous standard; the violation
must be clearly established; clear beyond a reasonable doubt;
clearly a violation; etc. 7 0° The most logical interpretation of
these standards is that disclosure is contingent upon the absense of any nonfrivolous argument in favor of the legality of the
conduct.
A problem arises from the existence of such an exacting
standard along with the serious consequences of inappropriate
disclosure. If the lawyer alleges client misconduct to the SEC,
serious consequences ensue for the client: the fact that an investigation has started may depress the market for the client's
securities; new public financing may become difficult or impossible; reputations of executives may be damaged; and management may be required to divert its attention from the business
to the investigation. The client will suffer some of these sanctions even if no violation is found. In addition, if the lawyer violates his fiduciary duty to the client by going to the SEC when
he had no duty to do so, he may incur financial liability and irreparable damage to his professional reputation. Of course, if
the lawyer had a duty to disclose client misconduct but did not,
he will be subject to severe sanctions.
If the lawyer goes to the SEC with allegations of client misconduct and a violation is found to exist, one would think that
the lawyer would be immune from liability for inappropriate disclosure. However, the fact that a violation has occurred does not
mean that the lawyer acted properly. He was entitled to disclose only if a violation was clearly established at the time he
made his disclosure.' 7 ' Even if the client was ultimately held
liable, the lawyer could still be sued for inappropriate disclosure
on the theory that he did not have reason to believe that the
169. Chicago Tribune, December 16, 1979, § 5 at 3 (dual interview with Mr.
Sommer and Charles Halperin).
170. See MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 7-102(B).
171. Id.
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violation was clearly established on the basis of the information
then available to him. Even if a violation is clearly established,
such immunity may be useless to the lawyer if, as is frequently
the case in securities litigation, the client settles. Settlement
could provide the client with a strong case for wrongful disclosure since, by definition, a settlement means that the client was
not found to have viQlated the law.' 72 There is no good reason to
extend the immunity rule to cover settlements since a defendant who has not violated the law i.e., the attorney's disclosure
was unwarranted, might settle to avoid the expense and adverse
publicity accompanying a trial. Even in the case of a clear violation, the SEC, because of its limited resources, may settle to expedite resolution of the case. Thus, the lawyer who publicly
accuses his client of wrongdoing is very vulnerable in the event
of a settlement; he cannot know when he goes to the SEC
whether the SEC is willing and able to fully litigate the case and
has no way of knowing whether or not private plaintiffs will
settle.
Where the original case was settled, the propriety of the
lawyer's disclosure, as well as the legality of the client's conduct,
would be determined in the client's action against the lawyer.
The lawyer would be subjected to a long trial and adverse publicity. These factors would provide a substantial incentive for
the lawyer to settle with the former client even if the lawyer's
original allegations were justified.
In addition, while it is often difficult, in any area, to ascertain a violation of law without a trial, the nature of the securities
area makes this an almost impossible task. The securities laws
are often imprecise, with cases turning on the meaning of ambiguous terms like "control," "reasonable business judgment,"
"public offering," and "materiality."'173 Even in clear cases of
wrongdoing there can normally be some argument made for the
legality of the conduct. For example, where the existence of a
falsehood in an SEC filing is undisputed, the client may always
deny its materiality, or where the client has not disclosed material developments regarding its business, as required by Rule
10b-5, it can claim that it was merely delaying the disclosure for
172. By settling a suit a defendant obviously avoids a finding that he was

guilty of the charge against him.
173. It has been observed that "[t] he securities laws involve many complex issues which seem to be constantly changing. Attorneys charge it is
unfair to hold them liable for acts of their clients which arguably could have
been seen as within the law." Note, The Duties and Obligationsof the Securities Lawyer: The Beginning of a New Standardfor the Legal Profession?,
1975 DuK-E L.J. 121, 144.
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a legitimate business reason. 174
Given the imprecision of the law in the securities area, it is
asking a lot of an attorney to declare that the client's activity is
such a clear violation that no nonfrivolous argument could be
made in the client's behalf. Counsel's predicament worsens if he
is expected to disclose the client's intention to commit a future
violation because the exact nature of the proposed activity may
not be clear and the client can abandon its supposedly wrongful
scheme before putting it into effect. In this event, the lawyer
risks a suit for wrongful disclosure based on the client's contention that no fraud was ever intended. Furthermore, the client's
superior access to records may allow it to destroy incriminating
evidence and to fabricate exonerating evidence.
A second line of analysis not extensively considered elsewhere is the treatment of the disclosure problem in other areas
of the law. This section of the article will consider the scope of
the lawyer's duty to reveal client violations of various non-securities laws in both business and nonbusiness contexts.
In the business area, the only authority specifically dealing
with this question is the income tax regulations governing the
conduct of attorneys and accountants who practice before the
Internal Revenue Service. The first of these provisions states:
Each attorney, certified public accountant, or enrolled agent who,
having been retained by a client with respect to a matter administered by the Internal Revenue Service, knows that the client has
not complied with the revenue laws of the United States or has
made an error or omission from any return, document, affidavit, or
other paper which the client, is required by the revenue laws of the
United States to execute, shall advise the client
promptly of the fact
75
of such noncompliance, error,or omission.'

A second provision defines "disreputable conduct," for which
the tax practitioner is subject to discipline, to include "[g] iving
false or misleading information or participating in any way in
the giving of false or misleading information to the Department
of the Treasury... knowing such information to be false or misleading."'1 76 These provisions certainly impose no duty of disclosure on attorneys and may or may not require an attorney
representing a client engaged in tax fraud to withdraw from the
174. FinancialIndus. Fund,Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514

(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874. It would seem that this argument
was open to the attorney and client in In re Carterin view of management's
claim that its refusal to disclose the need to implement the LMP was attributable to its attempt to negotiate a waiver of its obligation to implement the

plan. Of course, even acceptance of this argument would not excuse the
issuance of the excessively optimistic press releases.
175. 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1977) (emphasis added).

176. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(b) (1977).
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representation depending on how broadly "participating" is
defined.
Outside the tax area, the business practitioner is under no
duty to disclose client misconduct, indicating, perhaps, that the
traditional rules of confidentiality apply. 177 Outside the business area, the question of disclosure has arisen mainly in connection with professionals who are aware that their clients
intend to commit, or have committed, acts of violence. The most
celebrated case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,178 involved a psychotherapist rather than a lawyer. In
Tarasoff, a psychotherapist who knew of his patient's intention
to kill a particular person was held to be negligent for not informing the victim or the police before the killing occurred. The
court rejected the therapist's defense of a statutory obligation to
preserve patient confidences because the statute imposing the
obligation permitted disclosure when necessary to protect the
person or property of another. 179 With respect to a lawyer's obligation to disclose when necessary to prevent a client from endangering human life, one commentator has expressed the view
that, "[o] ne wouldn't question the lawyer's obligation if the situation were one where a hazardous drug is let loose on the public
[by the client]. It would plainly be a lawyer's duty to report the
situation to authorities who could prevent the drug from damag80
ing the public users."'
A case dealing with this issue, People v. Belge,' 8 ' involved
two lawyers who, while defending a client in a criminal prosecution, were told by the client that he had committed two murders
and hidden the bodies in a specified location which he disclosed
to the lawyers. The lawyers found and photographed the bodies
but did not disclose their knowledge to anyone until the client
confessed the crime. One of the lawyers was indicted for violating a New York statute which requires anyone aware of an unreported death to notify the authorities. He was acquitted
because of the obligation of confidentiality, but the court indi177. This supposition is supported by at least one commentator. "It is
noteworthy that no federal administrative agency other than the SEC has
adopted, proposed, or even informally advocated imposing upon lawyers
obligations similar to those proposed by the SEC." Lipman, supra note 14,
at 476.
178. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
179. Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. Several legal commentators have indicated that this holding could be used as authority for
the position that a duty of disclosure should be imposed on the securities
attorney who is aware of his client's securities fraud. E.g., Gruenbaum,
supra note 16, at 826; Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1397.
180. Leiman, supra note 97, at 273.
181. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), affd, 50 A.D.2d 1088 (1975),
aI'd per curiam, 41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976).
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cated that a closer question would have been presented if the
indictment had been for obstruction of justice. 182 The New York
State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics also
exonerated the attorney, ruling "that the attorney had an ethical
duty to withhold the incriminating information about his client's
previous murders."'1 83 This view has been criticized. 184 Although one could attempt to reconcile Belge with an expansive
view of the lawyer's obligation, by noting that in Belge the attorneys were not in a position to prevent the client's crime, the attorneys' silence allowed a confessed double murderer to avoid
apprehension, obviously posing a threat to the public, probably
caused innocent people to be the subject of police investigation
and prolonged the period of agonizing uncertainty for the families of the victims.
What are the implications of the preceding discussion in the
securities area? It appears that the cases in which a duty of disclosure is imposed on professionals involve situations where the
disclosure prevents the client from endangering the life of another. This rationale, although controversial, is inapplicable to
the securities area. Second, it is ironic that, while there is controversy over whether a lawyer must disclose his client's past
murders, the SEC is attempting to require disclosure of past securities violations.
Obviously, there is a social interest in having those who violate the securities laws brought to justice. However, there is certainly no less interest in facilitating the prompt apprehension of
182. 83 Mis. 2d 186, 191, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (1975), affd, 50 A.D.2d 1088
(1975), aff'd per curiam, 41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976). In its affirmance, the appellate
division also indicated that the attorney's obligation of confidentiality is not
absolute. 50 A.D.2d 1088.
183. Comment, Problem of an Attorney in Possessionof Evidence Incriminating his Client: The Needfor a PredictableStandard, 47 U. CIN.L.REV.
431, 433 (1978). Dean Freedman has expressed his view that the action of
the two lawyers was entirely correct: "In short, not only did the two lawyers behave properly, but they would have committed a serious breach of
professional responsibility if they had divulged information that was contrary to their client's interest." Freedman, Where the Bodies are Buried:
The Adversary System and the Obligation of Confidentiality, 10 CaMi. L.
BUiL.979, 981 (1974). This response may invite the question of whether the
murderer was actually out on bail during the first prosecution. Obviously, if
he was not out on bail during the first trial, the lawyers' silence did not
allow him to directly inflict further harm on anyone. However, there is no
indication that the answer to this question played any role in the courts'
analysis since none of the cited opinions ever mentioned whether or not the
killer was free on bail. In any event, the attorneys' silence presumably
caused innocent people to be the subject of police investigation and did prolong the uncertainty for the victims' families.
184. E.g., Edwards, HardAnswers for Hard Questions: Dissenting in Part
from Dean Freedman's Views on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 11 CRIm. L.

BuLL. 478 (1975).
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murderers and preventing unwarranted police investigation of
innocent people. Accordingly, it seems anomolous to impose a
higher level of responsibility on the securities lawyer than on an
attorney for an unapprehended murderer.
The business area provides further support for the rule of
confidentiality. Apparently, with the exception of the SEC,
those responsible for enforcing business regulations feel that it
is possible to satisfactorily enforce those laws without imposing
special responsibilities on lawyers. A former SEC chairman has
attempted to justify this disparity:
I think it is very dangerous to draw analogies between the securities laws and other laws in trying to decide what is the professional's responsibility. There are a long line of cases going back to
when the securities acts were enacted stating that the legislation is
remedial and that its purposes are to be broadly construed. So, I
see a trend in the securities
area different from that in the divorce,
185
tax or antitrust fields.
This argument is unpersuasive. First, the securities laws are
certainly not the only federal remedial legislation; the antitrust
laws also fit this description. More importantly, the fact that legislation is remedial does not establish the need for large scale
alterations in the traditional attorney-client relationship for enforcement purposes.
Although the imposition of greater attorney responsibility
in all areas might be desirable, the fact that those responsible
for enforcing other business laws do not find it necessary to advocate disclosure should establish a presumption against such
action. Such a presumption could be overcome in the securities
area by a demonstration that enforcement of securities laws is
uniquely difficult and that extending the disclosure requirement
to lawyers would significantly ameliorate the difficulties. Merely
proclaiming that the securities laws are remedial, without somehow distinguishing them, does not justify the imposition of additional burdens upon the securities practitioner.
A third policy consideration, not extensively explored, is the
impact of a rule requiring attorney disclosure of securities violations to the client's shareholders. Over the long run it would be
to the advantage of the corporate entity to force compliance with
the securities laws. Thus it will often be to the advantage of
long-term shareholders to require counsel to disclose management wrongdoing. The issue is not so simple, however, when
considering the interest of short-term shareholders.
185. Cohen, Wheat, Henderson, ProfessionalResponsibility-The Corporate Bar, 4 INST. ON SEC. REG.

(PLI) 181, 231 (1973).
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The difficulty with imposing a duty of disclosure is most apparent in the case where the client refuses to disclose, in current
SEC filings, some past, undetected violation. Disclosure here
virtually invites lawsuits by aggrieved parties; lawsuits which
might never be brought if the lawyer conceals his client's unwillingness to disclose the previous wrong.
In this situation, there is a conflict between the interests of
various classes of shareholders. Disclosure would, at least temporarily, depress the client's stock prices. This would be adverse to the interest of shareholders who intend to sell their
holdings in the near future. Conversely, potential shareholders
would obviously benefit from disclosure of the corporation's potential liabilities. The effect on long-term shareholders depends
on a comparison of the benefits of the ouster of corrupt or inof lawsuits against
competent management with the detriment186
the corporation arising from the disclosure.
Moreover, even where the securities violation involves misrepresentation in the sale of securities to existing shareholders,
such shareholders may be harmed by disclosure of the violation.
Disclosure of possible fraud in the sale of a company's securities
will certainly cause their price to fall when potential investors
become aware of the previously concealed adverse information
and call the general honesty and competence of the management into question. The shareholders may also be adversly af186. At least one commentator has recognized the existence of this con-

flict. Small, An Attorney's ResponsibilitiesUnder Federal and State Securities Laws: Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1223

(1975) [hereinafter cited as Small]. Some commentators have suggested
that requiring disclosure here is always detrimental to the interests of the
shareholders. Lipman, supra note 14, at 460. "In short the Commission
would require disclosure of information which is diametrically opposed to
the interest of the company and its shareholders." Hoffman, supra note 19,
at 1412-18. This view may fail to recognize the benefits to some shareholders of facilitating the discharge of corrupt management or it may reflect the
judgment that even for long term shareholders, these benefits are outweighed by the costs discussed above. Former Commissioner Pollack has
recognized the conflict between the interest of many of the shareholders in
nondisclosure and the public interest in disclosure but has indicated that
he prefers to see the public interest prevail: "You have to balance the public interest against the interest of the corporation and when errors are made
and they affect people outside, sometimes your only alternative is to disclose and suffer the consequences rather than to compound your liability by
inducing other people to come in." Cohen, Wheat, Henderson, Professional
Responsibility-The Corporate Bar, 4 INST. ON SEC. REG. (PUI) 181, 231
(1973). Other commentators suggest that either present law imposes no
such disclosure obligation, Cf. Leiman, supra note 97, at 286; Cohen, Wheat,
Henderson, ProfessionalResponsibility-The CorporateBar, 4 INsT. ON SEC.
REG. (PLI) 181, 233-34, or that even if the client does have such an obligation, the lawyer may assist the client in preparing a 10-K which makes no
reference to the contingent liability without subjecting himself to sanctions.
Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1418; Small, supra note 186, at 1227.
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fected by claims against the corporation by former shareholders
who sold before the disclosure but who may be able to assert
securities claims anyway. Furthermore, the shareholders may
be disadvantaged because of difficulties in obtaining new financing, resulting from revelations questioning the trustworthiness
of the company's financial disclosure documents.
Disclosure of the fraud will, of course, allow existing share1 87
It
holders to assert personal claims under the securities laws.
is debatable, however, whether such suits will fully compensate
them for their loss. The biggest obstacle to full recovery by
shareholders is the time element. The price of the company's
outstanding securities will drop immediately upon disclosure
while any recovery is likely to be in the fairly distant future.
Thus, a shareholder who wishes to liquidate his holdings while
the suit is pending may have a short-term cash-flow problem. In
addition, legal fees, not usually recoverable from the defendant,
normally take a sizeable chunk out of any recovery. As a practical matter, therefore, a defrauded shareholder may be better off
if the fraud is never disclosed. 88 If a disclosure duty is to be
imposed, it should be justified on the basis that the benefit to
the investing public greatly outweighs any detrimental impact
upon shareholders.
Validity of the Distinction Between Past and Future
Securities Violations
A fourth set of considerations concerns the distinction between past and future violations in defining the scope of the lawyer's duty. A requirement of disclosure before a violation occurs
arguably serves to protect the public. However, when the violation that the attorney would be required to disclose is the client's refusal to reveal the material contingent liability
attributable to the initial violation, disclosure by the attorney
does not, in most cases, prevent the infliction of harm on the
public. Rather, concealment of the client's refusal to disclose
187. 1933 and 1934 Acts, supra note 2.
188. Recent decisions in the two major SEC initiated proceedings have
indicated that the attorney's duty to disclose arises in part from his obligation to his client's shareholders. "[T] he attorneys' responsibilities to their
corporate client required them to take steps to ensure that the information
would be disclosed to the shareholders." SEC v. National Student Mktg.
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978). "It is concluded that respondents
failed to carry out their professional responsibilities with respect to appropriate disclosure to all concerned including stockholders, directors and the
investing public ... ." In re Carter and Johnson [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC.

L. REP. (CCH)

82,175, at p. 82,183 (emphasis added). There is

absolutely no discussion in either opinion of the possible adverse repercussions that disclosure would have for the existing shareholders.

19821

Policeman, Conscience or Confidant

maintains the price of corporate securities. And, while existing
security holders may have paid a higher price than they would
have had the violations been disclosed before they bought, they
will also receive a higher price when they sell. The harm is,
therefore, shifted from existing shareholders to those purchasing from them. It is critical to note that disclosure under these
circumstances does not prevent the infliction of any new harm,
but merely transfers the risk of harm from one group to another.
The issue then is whether the loss associated with the undisclosed information is to be borne by existing shareholders, or
by those purchasing from them. In view of the improbability of
preventing harm to someone, the rationale which requires disclosure of future offenses should not apply when past conduct is
the issue. The implication of this conclusion is that the continuous disclosure required by the 1914 Act should not affect the
scope of the lawyer's responsibility except where disclosure can
prevent an initial violation. Accordingly, the future crime provisions of DR 4-101(c) (3) should not be applied literally in the
securities context. Preventing the future crime of nondisclosure
of a past violation does not normally prevent harm to investors. 189 Injury is prevented only where the imminent violation is
failure to report something other than a completed past
90
transgression.
189. The commentary that has been addressed to this issue thus far has
made the point that under whatever standards currently govern lawyers'
conduct in this context, the continuous disclosure system is highly relevant
to the lawyer's duty. E.g., Cohen, Wheat, Henderson, ProfessionalResponsibility-The CorporateBar, 4 INST. ON SEC. REG. (PLI) 181 (1973).
[01ne thing that does distinguish this field from many others is the
continuousness or the repetitiousness of some of the problems-the
fact that yesterday's violations or yesterday's crime or fraud or
whatever can become today's or tomorrow's disclosure problem. So
what you can do in the ordinary course of practicing law about the revelation of a past crime or fraud does not necessarily apply when you get
to this miserable problem of what you do with the ongoing disclosure
process, with next month's 8-K or next year's 10-K.
Id. at 236. Whatever may be compelled by existing authority, there is no
reason to import this sort of analysis into the determination of the optimal
standard.
190. An additional implication of the imposition of a duty of disclosure on
the securities lawyer in this context is that the client is disadvantaged as a
result of its consultation with the lawyer. It is possible that the original
wrong would never have been disclosed if counsel had not been consulted
but the consultation with counsel has ensured disclosure. It is worth considering whether it is appropriate to penalize clients for using legal services
in such situations.
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The Relevance of the Client's Ability to Satisfy Judgments to
the Appropriate Scope of the Lawyer's Duty
The final consideration in this analysis is whether the lawyer should consider his client's financial ability to satisfy
whatever judgments arise from his violation in determining
whether disclosure is required. As noted above, 191 mandated
disclosure is said to, inter alia, protect investors from the harm
attributable to a particular violation. The danger to investors is
greatest when the client is unable to satisfy a judgment stemming from its violations thereby leaving aggrieved investors
without an adequate remedy. On the other hand, where it is
clear that any judgment arising from a securities violation could
be satisfied, it may be less important to prevent the violation
since the aggrieved parties could recover their losses through
192
shareholders' suits.
Prevention of irreparable harm is clearly the purpose of the
Model Rules which require disclosure of a client's intention to
kill or inflict serious physical harm on another. Similarly, a securities violation, for which the wrongdoer is unable to compensate those aggrieved by his action, might be considered
irreparable and thus an appropriate subject for mandated
disclosure.
SUGGESTED FORMULATION OF THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

The final section of this paper is devoted to proposals for the
appropriate standard of conduct. A major premise of these proposals is that the corporate counsel's true clients are the shareholders. Thus, these proposals place the shareholders' interests
above any conflicting interests. There is a fundamental distinction between requiring the lawyer to affirmatively assist in
bringing his client to justice and requiring the lawyer to refrain
from facilitating his client's indiscretions. The corporate attorney's role as a shareholders' advocate is severely undermined
where the lawyer is required, concomitantly, to champion the
191. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
192. There should not be great practical difficulty in the application of
this criterion since damages for many securities violations are often readily
ascertainable and counsel should be able to get a fairly good idea of the
client's ability to bear them by referring to the client's published financial
statements. For example, § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act contains an elaborate specification of the measure of damages in § 11 suits while § 12(2) of the same
Act basically provides for a simple recission measure of damages. Rule 10b5 has been applied to provide a sort of "expectation" measure of damages,
i.e., the difference between what the plaintiff paid/received for his security
and what he would have paid/received if the defendant had not breached
his duty of disclosure.
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public interest. In short, the lawyer cannot be effective, as a
lawyer, when he is also required to be a policeman.
When counsel becomes aware of information that would indicate to a reasonable securities lawyer that his client's conduct
probably violates the securities laws, counsel should be required to make some preliminary investigation into the client's
activities. This duty to investigate applies to both past and future violations. A fairly high degree of certainty applies to this
duty; it must be probable that the conduct violates the securities
laws because the initiation of an investigation into the client's
conduct may generate enough animosity toward counsel by
management 193to seriously impair the lawyer-client working
relationship.
It is impossible to prescribe the exact scope of the investigation but consultation with those primarily responsible for the
suspected conduct would usually be necessary. The responses
elicited in this consultation would determine the necessity of
further inquiries. When time is limited, no obligation to investigate should be imposed on the attorney because of the overriding interest in ensuring that the lawyer assumes an adversarial
posture vis d vis his client only in cases where there is good
reason to believe there was a violation. Of course, where the
initial evidence of fraud is extraordinarily trustworthy, less investigation is required to justify further action.
Where the information from the lawyer's investigation
would cause a reasonable securities attorney to believe that a
violation had occurred or is imminent, and this conclusion is
supported by clear and convincing evidence, counsel should inform the individual(s) responsible for the violation of his conclusion and prevail upon them to refrain from future violations
and/or bring past violations to the attention of the board of directors. If the confronted individual refuses to comply, counsel
should bring his suspicions to the client's board of directors unless time constraints make it impossible to do so. In the case of
a past violation, as defined in the preceeding Section, disclosure
to the board exhausts counsel's obligation. In the case of a future violation, counsel's additional obligations depend on the
193. No negligence standard has been imposed here, i.e., investigation
would be required where counsel should be aware of information indicating
that a violation is probable, because such a standard would encourage counsel to assume a sort of permanent investigatory posture. Such a position is
inconsistent with counsel's role as a confidante of the client, a role that is
worthy of preservation simply because the maintenance of such a relationship is essential if the client is to have the benefit of a candid and thorough
discussion of its entire legal situation. A lawyer cast in an investigatory role
will not enjoy the trust of management to the extent necessary for a proper

working relationship to exist.
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board's response. If the board abandons the objectionable
course of action, counsel has no further duty. If the board refuses to abandon the objectionable conduct, counsel must refrain from further advisory representation of the client in
securities matters. 194 Withholding advice is a logical response
since, in all probability, any advice sought at this juncture will
be sought in an effort to avoid the consequences of the wrong.
Different considerations arise when the issue is whether the
lawyer may defend the client in proceedings brought as a result
of a wrong which the lawyer knew the client was going to commit. First, by defending the client, the lawyer is not assisting
the violation. Second, our adversary- system entitles even a
wrongdoer to insist, with the assistance of a trained advocate,
that the case against him be proved.
Where the securities attorney's client is an individual investor rather than a corporation, the preceding step is obviously inapplicable. If the client refuses to abandon its intention to
perpetrate a future violation, the mandatory withdrawal provision is triggered. 19 5 With respect to a past violation no action
beyond directing the client to rectify its violation need be taken.
Once counsel withdraws representation, he should be released from further obligation except where the following criteria exist: 1) the client appears irrevocably committed to the
course of conduct in question; 2) reasonable securities counsel
would conclude, on the basis of existing authority, that the conduct cannot be supported by a nonfrivolous argument, and; 3) it
appears, on the basis of the financial data available to the public
as well as the most realistic estimate of the damages attributable to the violation, that the client would not be able to satisfy all
money judgments likely to result from the violation. 19 6 Only if
all three of the above criteria are satisfied, should the attorney
disclose the client's intentions to the SEC.
An explanation of the rationale underlying the general rule
and the exception are in order. With respect to past violations,
the only possible purpose served by a duty of disclosure is deterrence. The argument that the SEC's lack of resources justifies using securities lawyers to police the markets is meritless.
Once the fraud has occurred, disclosure merely prevents the
194. The rationale underlying this position is that it is simply inappropriate for the attorney to take any action to assist the client in pursuing an
illegal course of conduct.
195. See MODEL CODE, supra note 69, at DR 2-110(B)(2) (1979).
196. In order to avoid requiring the lawyer to immerse himself in the law
of bankruptcy when applying this criterion, the criterion will be deemed
satisfied if the liability created by the judgement would make the client
insolvent.
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shifting of the harm to potential purchasers of the client's securities without preventing harm to investors as a whole. 197 Even
assuming arguendo that the public is relying on the lawyer to
ensure his client's compliance with the law, the fact that the
fraud occurred indicates that such reliance is misplaced. Moreover, there exist more effective, more appropriate modes of enforcing compliance. The deterrence rationale is thus insufficient
justification for the disclosure rule. The unwillingness of regulatory authorities in other areas of the law to compel attorneys to
disclose client misconduct which is not life endangering tends to
indicate that other deterrents are satisfactory.1 98 Furthermore,
as suggested, a large proportion of securities violations ultimately surface without attorney intervention. Theoretically,
this fact should, itself, be a deterrent.
Even if disclosure did have some modest deterrent effect,
the negative implications of mandatory disclosure far outweigh
the benefits. The adverse effects of a disclosure requirement,
summarized, are: (1) that such a requirement would induce the
attorney to influence the client's conduct so as to protect the attorney's interest; (2) the excessive degree of risk and difficulty
entailed in the identification of reportable violations, and;
(3) the possible harm to the shareholders associated with disclosure. Furthermore, since disclosure has the effect of imposing serious sanctions on the client, it is undesirable to impose
such a burden on the client without the benefit of any judicial
consideration prior to the imposition of the sanction.
Disclosure of future violations, admittedly, could prevent injury to third parties. Even so, the detriments associated with
extending any disclosure rule at all to attorneys outweigh the
benefits. All the arguments against requiring attorneys to divulge the client's past violations may be aptly used to argue
against requiring attorney disclosure of future violations. In addition, the attorney faces a greater risk of liability to his client
for wrongful disclosure here than he does in the case of a past
violation; the client might abandon the proposed fraud and then
deny that it was ever contemplated. Assuming that a judgment
in favor of the victims of the violations could be satisfied, the
potentially injurious effect of a disclosure rule upon the attorney, his client, and the attorney-client relationship, is of graver
concern than is the comparatively nominal loss suffered by the
victims of an undisclosed scheme. 199 The requirement that the
197. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
198. See supra pp. 420-24.
199. Certainly, the necessity of incurring legal fees in order to prosecute
a claim under the securities laws increases the benefits to potential victims
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lawyer terminate his representation of the client who will not
refrain from objectionable conduct may be an effective and, in
any case, more palatable deterrent. Once apprised of the possible consequences, many clients are likely to abandon their dubious plans. Threatened loss of the lawyer's assistance in drafting
documents, rendering opinions, negotiating, etc., is also likely to
prevent the consummation of many illegal transactions.
By contrast, if the client's conduct is unequivocally illegal,
and it is clear that the client will not be able to satisfy judgments
against it, the subordination of attorney-client interests to the
interests of potential victims may be justified. Only rarely, however, are the circumstances so straightforward. With even less
frequency do blatant violations remain undiscovered and undisclosed by someone other than the perpetrator's lawyer. The
question becomes whether an attorney disclosure rule should
be adopted because of the relatively few cases in which its benefits will outweigh its detriments.
Theoretically, the attorney could be required to assess the
likelihood that his client's misconduct will be disclosed by
someone else. If disclosure by someone else is unlikely, the attorney would be required to supply the information himself.
Formulating criteria for such a judgment would, however, be impossible. In conjunction with the necessity of determining
whether there is a violation, whether the violation is "clear," and
whether the client is able to satisfy a judgment stemming from
the violation, the burden of assessing the likelihood of detection
would be overwhelming. In light of the difficulty of identifying
client violations, the burden of establishing that an attorney
failed to satisfy any of the obligations set out above should be on
the party making such a claim against the attorney.
To summarize, this proposal addresses the interests of several parties, in the securities area, affected by the issue of a disclosure duty. The lawyer's incentive to steer the client away
from any particular course of action is minimized since in virtually all cases the lawyer will be free of any obligation to disclose. 200 Accordingly, the client receives the benefits of the
of the wrongdoing of requiring the lawyer to disclose his client's intentions.
However, this factor is not significant enough to affect the overall balance of
considerations. Even assuming that the victims do find their net recovery
to be somewhat less than their loss, so long as they recover the better part
of their loss, the other implicated interests outweigh their interest in completely preventing any loss.
200. Although it is conceivable that an attorney could be subjected to liability for wrongful resignation since a resignation may be deemed a breach
of the lawyer's fiduciary duty if it prevents the consummation of a transaction, this will not be a great problem under this formulation. The express
exception to the lawyer's obligation of investigation, etc. for situations in
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lawyer's objective analysis. The public interest is served by
prohibiting lawyers from assisting clients' securities violations
and requiring disclosure of clear violations where such disclosure is the only way of preventing irreparable harm to investors.
The interest of the shareholders is recognized by prohibiting the
lawyer from making public accusations of wrongdoing while requiring that the board of directors be apprised of all management securities violations. This protects existing shareholders
against sudden drops in the market attributable to the lawyer's
action while encouraging exposure of corrupt management. The
lawyer is spared the risks imposed upon him by a general duty
of disclosure.
Although this proposal does not fully accommodate all of
the interests of the parties affected, it does serve to accommodate the major interests involved. It also constitutes at least a
beginning of the analysis necessary to maximize the collective
well-being of all securities market participants.

which time does not permit an investigation, drastically reduces the attorney's risk. Resignation is likely to cause the breakdown of a deal mainly in
situations where the lawyer is apprised of information immediately before
the deal is to be closed suggesting that the deal violates the law. Under this
formulation, such information would trigger any duty on the part of the lawyer only if there was sufficient time for the lawyer to conclusively establish
the illegality of the deal. Resignation at that point would seem to carry little
risk for the lawyer. Where resignation did not occur immediately before a

deal was to close, it is difficult to see how it could cause the breakdown of
the deal since the client would have time to engage other counsel.

